In early 1954, the Vietminh took the French outpost at Dien Bien Phu, a huge French fortress 175 miles west of Hanoi. At Dien Bien Phu, there were hardly any villages nearbly, therefore the French thought there would be a lack of local support. Even though the outpost was far from French forces, they assumed that the Vietminh would not be able to mobilize their men, supplies, and equipment. The French concentrated much of their equipment and supplies at Dien Bien Phu, hoping to lure General Vo Nguyen Giap into attacking the fort, which they thought would result in a devastating Communist defeat.

On the contrary, the Vietminh began to transport their men and equipment through the rugged terrain. Slowly, they started to concentrate their artillery into the hills surrounding Dien Bien Phu. The amount of weapons that was placed prevented the French from landing planes to deliver supplies at Dien Bien Phu. By then, the French could not save the base. The result of the French Union after the battle was about 4,000 killed and wounded and 8,000 captured. The result of the Communist forces was about 8,000 killed and 12,000 wounded.

The stronghold was more of a psychological than a military pivot of the First Indochina War. It reduced France's willingness to fight in Indochina. The victory at Dien Bien Phu also allowed the Communist forces receive what they sought at the Geneva Conference.

The United States considered to intervene by using their aircrafts to save the French outpost at Dien Bien Phu but President Eisenhower had opposed the notion. He did not wish to commit the U.S. to a large role in Indochina.

Photos Courtesy of Archive Photos