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Longzhong Plan
Wang Fuzhi (1619-92), a famous Qing scholar, is critical of the strategic goal of the Longzhong Plan because of the two-pronged offensive that was intrinsic to the plan did not make a distinction as to which prong was the decoy and which was the main force. He alludes to the plan as being without any subtlety: such as using the stratagem "make a sound in the east but strike in the west". Nor did it incorporate any hint of the interplay between zheng and qi - the orthodox, apparent and overt military operation, and its opposite, a surprise, covert, or unexpected military action which brings about victory for a weaker force. Wang Fuzhi notes that one who seeks to seize All Under Heaven from a comparatively weak position must be flexible in strategic planning in order to grasp the opportunity to use qi to obtain victory.

Others charge that the political goal of the Longzhong Plan was flawed because the restoration of the Han court was unrealistic. The Wei government, considered by Zhuge Liang to be illegal, had effectively dealt with economic and political issues and had gained the support of the people. The military historians at the Military Science Academy in Beijing view Zhuge Liang's political goal as inappropriate and unrealistic even in 207 when the plan was formulated and totally irrelevant by the time of the Northern Expedition. The idea of seizing Jingzhou in the Longzhong Plan was a flawed concept because Sun Quan would never accept Liu Bei in control of this critical area, crucial for the security of his Jiangnan base. In essence, Zhuge Liang is charged with failing to make an objective analysis of the political situation in 207. The diplomatic success in restoring the alliance with Sun Quan prior to the Northern Expeditions is dismissed as useless because it brought little strategic dividend: each side had different political agendas which precluded close military coordination. Once the first Northern Expedition was turned back, the Wei state was capable of handling the two-front threat without much difficulty.

::Part I:: ::Part II::

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