Battle of Chibi
Following his victory over Liu Bei, Cao Cao decided to act immediately. From Xiangyang, his main force marched south to Jiangling and started preparing a massive fleet to sail downriver against the allies. In the eleventh month, Cao's army advanced along the Yangzi and was checked near Crow Forest (Wuling). Allied troops occupied the southern bank and river defenses had been prepared. By this time, the northern army had been hampered by disease and was unable to fight effectively on water. In such a situation, Cao Cao ordered that his warships be tied together so that his naval forces resembled a massive floating platform. In addition, further attacks were postponed and his army trained together with the Jingzhou men to improve their ability at amphibious assaults. Even though the Allied armies had won an early victory, Cao Cao's change of tactics meant that his army would be much harder to better in the future. A suggestion was made for immediate offensive, but neither Sun nor Liu could afford the heavy losses which would surely result.
The final strategy was a masterful use of deception and guile which would become famous to all Chinese strategists. Huang Gai suggested the use of fireships and he was sent to surrender to Cao Cao. Such a move should have been recognised by Cao as a ruse, since the veteran Huang was one of the most outspoken campaigners for resistance against the northern foe. Nevertheless, he did not and it led to disaster for his army. Huang Gai organised small boarding boats into groups of ten and stocked each with dry grass and incendiary oil. With the easterly wind he sailed west. The deception of surrender allowed his boats to move significantly close to Cao Cao's fleet at Red Cliffs. As the enemy watched on, Huang ordered the lighting of the boats and his men swiftly moved to prepared boats and withdrew. As the easterly wind continued to carry the 'fireships' toward Cao Cao's fleet, panic spread in his ranks. His vessels were too large to retreat or maneovre away quickly enough and the iron links he used proved to be a pitfall. The fireships crashed into Cao's forces and wrecked havoc amongst his men. Fire even caught on to some of his onshore bases. By the time the inferno was over, the invasion had effectively been halted. Casualties were so high that Cao Cao knew his dream of a quick conquest was over.
Legend
- RED == Shu and Wu's armies attacking routes
- Yellow = Shu's route
- Blue + Star = Shu and Wu's Chasing route
- Purple + Brid = Cao Cao's escape route
- Red Circle = Major battle ground
Zhou Yu followed up this triumph with an offensive and Cao's army was beaten into retreat. Cao Cao himself led his ragged retinue along Huarong Way back to Jiangling, having lost half his troop strength and any further will to battle. He withdrew back to the capital Xuchang, leaving General Cao Ren to secure Jingzhou. In the aftermath, Zhou Yu led the Sun forces to attack Jiangling, and ordered lieutenant general Gan Ning to divert troops to take Yiling. Sun Quan himself led his main forces against Hefei in the north. Liu Bei also advanced on Jiangling and then swiftly returned to Xiakou and sailed along the Han River to assault Cao Ren's rear. The former allies now contested over the spoils of Jingzhou.
Such a victory was indeed impressive for the southerners, who had won through the will to resist and the skill to prevail. How such a master strategist such as Cao Cao could have lost the battle with superior numbers lies both in his personality and in the situation. It has been the general view in Chinese historiography that part of the reason for loss is due, at least partly, to Cao Cao's arrogance. This could well have been the case and may have impaired his judgement, allowing him make rash and ill-considered decisions. It is my opinion that the situation he was in played a much greater part. The very difficulty of logistics of such a large army over such great distance from the capital would have handicapped its performance and maneuverability. Professor Rafe de Crespigny has drawn attention to the fact that the northern army was severely drained from its campaign against the Wuhuan and that Cao Cao's southern expedition was a move in the hope of achieving a quick victory against disorganised foes rather than a concerted drive for victory.