|
Ronald
Reagan: Evaluation
Although
there can certainly be argument about the success of Reagans
foreign policy, no one can contest that the administration was
focused. In his bid for the presidency, Reagan made it clear
that he considered the Soviets a threat and that he would take steps
to check the spread of communist influence. As his presidency
progressed, Reagan stuck by this philosophy. Every major
foreign policy maneuver, from the invasion of Grenada to US
intervention in Lebanon, had the Soviet Union in mind. The
success of these programs, and even their necessity, is questionable, however.
One
of the gravest threats to the US, as Reagan saw it, was the growth
of Communism in the Western Hemispheres. On this stage, the
administration experienced one of its finest hours, along with its
darkest. The invasion of Grenada in 1983 to expel Soviet and
Cuban influence and to rescue American students proved to be one of
the wisest and easiest decisions Reagan made in area of foreign
policy. The operation went off with out a hitch, the Soviets
were expelled from the island that could have become another Cuba,
and the students were brought home safely.
Still,
the whole mission almost backfired when the bombing of the Marine
barracks in Beirut occurred right on top of the decision to invade
Grenada. After the tragic deaths brought about by US
intervention, initial response to the invasion was negative.
The emotional homecoming of the students convinced the nation that
the rescue had to be done to save lives. As Secretary of Shultz
later wrote, We had won a clean sweep: on the ground in Grenada
and in the hearts of the American people. The
invasion sent a clear message to the Russians and other usurpers
and despots that the US was willing to use force to defend its
principles and its people.
While
the administration's Central America policy brought about a clear
victory, it was also at the center of an incident that nearly caused
Reagans downfall. The Iran-Contra affair, which funneled
profits from illegal arms sales to Iran to Contras fighting against a
communist regime in Nicaragua, spawned a congressional investigation
into the administration that led to the indictment of several key
members of Reagans team, including defense secretary Casper
Wintered Although aspects of the arms sales to Iran were
illegal, the vast majority of indictments that came out of
Walshs investigation were as a result of the
administrations attempts to hide the nature of the dealings
with Congress.
Reagans
involvement in this, the key area, is disputed. While Reagan
did authorize the selling of arms to Iran and did sanction continued
US aid to the Contras after congressional funding was canceled, there
is disagreement as to whether or not Reagan made any attempt to hide
the truth from Congress. Walsh was of the opinion that Reagan was
deeply involved in illegal clandestine activities...to thwart
investigations by Congress and the courts. Secretary of
State Shultz, who was understandably very close to the issue,
had a different view. Shultz insisted that the president was
confused and misled about the facts in the incidents.
After
the Iran-Contra affair first became public and Reagan began denying
the arms for hostages deal, Shultz tried to convince the president
that he had been "deceived and lied to by those
closest to him in the administration. In Shultzs mind,
Reagan truly believed at that time that, while there were arms sales,
the president truly believed they were not being swapped for
hostages. Given Reagans history as a detached executive,
it seems likely that his advisors decided that plausible
deniability was best and hid the scope of the operation from
the president.
In
stark contrast to the decisive US victory in Grenada, the US
intervention in Lebanon was perhaps the worst setback of Reagans
presidency. After the May 17 Agreement, it seemed that the
administration had scored another victory. The withdrawal of
the PLO from Lebanon promised to end long-standing military and
terrorist strikes across the border into Israel, and the
establishment of a stable government in Lebanon could have severely
undercut Soviet influence in the area.
The
bombing of a US Marine barracks, however, turned the both the public
and Congress against a US presence quickly. Reagan was torn
between his wish to preserve public faith in his administration.
Finally, the decision was practically taken out of his hands
as his closest advisors, with the exception of the Secretary of
State, pressured him to get out of Lebanon.
With
the abrupt removal of US forces, the Lebanese army could not
consolidate its control in face of the warring factions or even see
to the removal of the Syrian army. In 1984, Syria established a
puppet government in Beirut, but conflicting Israel and Syrian
interests still kept the country in turmoil for almost a decade after that.
In
addition to direct military intervention, Reagan also put pressure
on the Soviets by announcing increased defense spending, most notably
through his promise to begin researching and developing a missile
defense system. The idea, which was uncharacteristically
introduced by Reagan himself, was encouraged by his advisors despite
universal agreement that a missile defense would be enormously
expensive, impractical, and unsuccessful.
Unlike
Reagan, who was excited and hopeful about the idea of shielding
Americans from Soviet missiles, his security advisors saw it as a way
to gain an advantage over the Soviets at the bargaining table because
SDI could be abandoned in return for further arms reductions by the Soviets.
The
idea backfired, however, when Reagan refused to stop research on the
system even when Gorbachev stated that the Soviet Union would not
participate in any more nuclear disarmaments until SDI was abandoned.
Gorbachev returned to the negotiating table after a physicist assured
him that the defense system was an impossibility.
As
far as the actual implementation of the shield, SDI cannot be
considered a total failure since Reagans failed initiative has
spawned recent attempts to produce a working national missile
defense. Still, it remains to be seen how successful these will prove.
In
combating the spread of Soviet influence, Reagans
administration can be considered successful, but the Soviet empire's
collapse was not entirely due to Reagan's policies. Although
some of their efforts did interfere with the spread of communism, by
the 1980s, the Soviet sphere was doomed. Internal weaknesses in
the bureaucracy and economic woes that extended back 30 years ensured
the eventual collapse of the communist government whatever the
actions of Reagans administration. |