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Jimmy Carter: Incidents Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan December 27, 1979 is considered the date the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. However, the Carter administration had been observing the growing Soviet presence in Afghanistan since May and had warned the Russian government several times that any intervention in the affairs of Afghanistan would not be tolerated. On a personal level, Carter was violently opposed to the invasion because he viewed the operation as an attempt by the Soviets to suppress a freedom-loving people who had done nothing to warrant Soviet aggression. The president and his advisors, however, also recognized the dangers a Soviet-controlled Afghanistan represented. A take-over of Afghanistan would mean a foothold in the Middle East and access and potential control over the oil fields in the Persian Gulf. Additionally, the Soviets could possibly control movement through key waterways in the region through which most of the world's oil had to pass. Immediately following the Soviet invasion, Carter fired off a warning to General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev in the harshest language possible. Carter warned Brezhnev that "unless you draw back from your present course of action, this will inevitably jeopardize the course of United States-Soviet relations throughout the world." The Soviets claimed that they were simply in the region at the request of various Afghan leaders to help protect Afghanistan against from "armed incursions from without." The administration, however, found no evidence of outside threats to Afghanistan (besides the Soviets). Additionally, the Afghan leader, Hafizulah Amin, who supposedly invited Russian forces into the country, was executed by the Soviets and replaced with a puppet government headed by Barbrak Karmal. Although direct military action was out of the question, Carter was determined to make Russia's decision to invade Afghanistan "as costly as possible." Carter felt that the most effective weapon to use against the Soviets was food. The Soviets were short on grain and there were few places to buy it, namely the United States, Canada, Australia, and Argentina. Carter was convinced that if the United States discontinued sale of grain to the Soviet Union and if Canada and Australia could be convinced not to supplement US grain, then the Brezhnev would be forced to withdraw. Many of those closest to Carter were opposed to the embargo because of the danger it posed to the US economy. Carter decided to proceed with the embargo, but promised to compensate farmers for any losses that came as a result of the embargo. In addition to the grain embargo, Carter warned the Soviet Union in January that unless a Soviet withdraw was begun in a month, the US would boycott the 1980 Olympic Games in Moscow. When the Soviets failed to back down, the US, along with 55 other nations, did not send teams to the Moscow Olympics. The Soviets did not respond favorably to Carter's threats. At the end of Carter's term, the Soviets still had not withdrawn from Afghanistan. Indeed, the Soviets kept a military presence there until 1988. The Panama Canal Treaty When Carter first started his move toward the White House in 1974, he was "only vaguely aware" that any debate about the state of the Panama Canal even existed. During the general election of 1976, Carter, avoided the issue as much possible. When pressed, Carter stated that he "would never give up complete control or practical control of the Panama Canal Zone." After his election, however, Carter reversed his position and the Panama Canal Treaties became the President's proudest foreign policy achievement. The new president felt Panama deserved the canal because the US had coerced the Panamanians into allowing the construction of the waterway. Carter referred to the situation with Panama as "a diplomatic cancer," and he felt that there was an injustice to correct. Although Carter approached the issue from a moral standpoint, the administration also saw more selfish reasons to hand over the canal. Panamanians had become increasingly bitter about the US military presence in Panama, and the President and his advisors believed the canal "was in serious danger from direct attack or sabotage" from disgruntled Panamanians. From Carter's standpoint, it was much more feasible to hand over the canal and avoid hostilities that could endanger the operation of the canal than to defend the Canal Zone from an angered Panama. Indeed, one officer in Panama observed that it would take at least 100,000 armed troops to defend the zone from a hostile Panama. Negotiations began on February 14, 1977, but snagged almost immediately when the US demanded to retain the right to use military force to keep the canal open. The two parties overcame the impasse in May when the Panamanians agreed to two separate treaties: one which gave control of the canal and the land surrounding it to the Panamanians and another that allowed for US military intervention in the event of a foreign attack. However, Panama immediately put the US negotiating team in a difficult position by demanding reparations that totaled well over $1.5 billion. Carter rejected these reparations out of hand, but did offer to increase Panama's share of the canal proceeds. After over a month of stalemate, General Torrijos, head of Panama, agreed to the administration's terms. Now, Carter faced a daunting task in the Senate to ratify the treaty. In one of the greatest lobbying efforts by any president, Carter, along with Chief of Staff Hamilton Jordan began to push the treaty through the Senate. At first, the task seemed in possible. In a poll conducted in October of 1977, opinion was running against the treaties by almost a two-to-one majority. Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona even advised the president not to get "too excited about this treaty." However, thanks in large part to Carter's efforts, public opinion came out in favor of the handing over the Canal Zone for the first time in February. Still, the first treaty passed by only a two vote margin, and the second, more controversial treaty, which actually gave the canal zone to Panama, was still to come. But now that he was this close, Carter refused to give up. The president contacted every Senator at least once and some as many as eight times to ensure ratification of the treaty. On a very tense April 18, the Senate finally ratified the second treaty by the same two vote margin. Camp David Accords Although the Panama Canal Treaties were a great personal achievement for Carter, his administration's most important accomplishment in foreign policy was the Egypt-Israeli peace treaty negotiated in Camp David in March of 1979. Between the founding of Israel after World War II and the Camp David Accords, the Arab nations surrounding the former Palestinian occupied territory waged four major wars and numerous battles with Israel. A lasting peace in the region, though a goal of every president since the late 1940s, still seemed virtually unattainable when Carter took office. Although Carter was discouraged about the chances of bringing these estranged nations together, he still made peace in the Middle East one of his foremost foreign policy goals. After taking office, it seemed clear to Carter that peace in the region would begin with a treaty between Israel and Egypt since these two nations were the most powerful and influential in the area. However, after the bitter October War of 1973, in which Egyptian and Syrian forces struck deep into Israeli territory until being driven back, bringing the two leaders into any sort of agreement would be difficult to say the least. Nevertheless, as early as 1977, members of Carter's administration began meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat about the situation between the two nations. After well over a year of working closely with the two leaders, however, no progress had been made. The breakdown of relations between the two nations had reached the point that Carter had begun to feel significant political pressure from his fellow Democrats to step back from the talks between Egypt and Israel because the continued failures were beginning to erode both domestic and Israeli support for the party and Carter. One group of senior Democratic advisors even told Carter that the Middle East negotiations were "a losing prospect," and the administration should stay as distant as possible from the negotiations. Although Carter recognized the total lack of progress, both he and his advisors still thought one last effort should be given because it was obvious that both the Israelis and the Arabs wanted peace. Carter wrote virtually identical invitations to both Begin and Sadat to attend a meeting directly with the president at Camp David. Both leaders agreed immediately. In preparation, Carter had his two top foreign policy advisors, Secretary of State Cy Vance and national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, begin formulating a plan for peace that could be acceptable to both sides. Carter, Sadat, and Begin met at Camp David with very limited staff for 13 days. Initially, Carter met with the two men simultaneously. But since the two leaders did not get along, Carter began speaking with the two separately. However, progress was still limited until day eight when Sadat accepted a four page proposal for peace because it called for" full Egyptian sovereignty...in the Sinai," which was a region of Egyptian land controlled by the Israelis since the Six-Day War of 1967. Begin, however, rejected thiskey plank and stated he would never agree to the removal of Israeli settlements from the Sinai. However, after intense pressure from his own cabinet, Begin capitulated. Although other disagreements arose during the summit, the tone was set for compromise and settlement. Finally, after 13 days, Carter was able to announce that a consensus had been reached calling for the signing of the peace treaty. Although many key issues remained unresolved, a framework for further peaceful interaction between the Israeli and Egypt had been built Hostage Crisis While Russia tried to gain an advantage in the Middle East by invading Afghanistan, the US instead focused on maintaining good relations with Iran, which was seen by the administration as crucial to Middle East stability because of its powerful military which acted as a check on Soviet aggression. Additionally, its influence in OPEC made Iran crucial to the US economy. Since the shah, the leader of Iran, had long been a friend to the US in the Middle East, the Carter administration made the decision to support the current Iranian government when opposition to the shah began to grow, led by the Ayatollah Khomeini. Unfortunately for Carter, his administration underestimated the danger the shah's government was in and failed to take adequate steps to protect the regime. In January of 1979, the shah fled Iran after more than a million anti-shah demonstrators marched through Tehran. Soon after, the Ayatollah arrived in Iran from France and began consolidating his power. At the end of October, the US allowed the shah to enter America for cancer treatment. Iranian militants stormed the embassy and took 60 hostages, while demanding the shah be returned to Iran to be put on trial. Although the Ayatollah apparently didn't order the attack, he supported it because he saw it as a chance to rid his government of any remaining moderates. Just two days after the seizure, Carter began formulating plans to rescue the hostages. But before such drastic measures were taken, Carter first attempted more diplomatic means. Carter began first to expel Iranian students from American colleges who had entered the country illegally and banning Iranian demonstrations on federal lands. Then, to show the world he was not walking softly around Iran because of US dependence on Middle East oil, Carter ordered the US to discontinue oil purchases from Iran. Finally,in his piece de resistance, Carter ordered all Iranian assets in the US frozen. When the Ayatollah did not seem influenced by US sanctions, Carter ordered a rescue attempt over the objections and later resignation of his Secretary of State. Unfortunately, the attempt failed and the livesof several US servicemen were lost. Finally, with few options left, the Carter administration listened to the Ayatollah's demands. In November of 1980, Iran set four conditions for the release of the hostages: no US interference in Iran; the unfreezing of Iranian assets inside and outside the United States; the cancellation of all sanctions; and the return of the shah's property. An agreement was reached in January 1981, and the hostages were released the day of Reagan's inauguration, minutes after Carter's term ended.
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