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Jimmy
Carter: Evaluation
Although
Carter's belief in an American foreign policy that was "as
decent and as rugged" as the American people was a refreshing
change for many voters after Nixon and Vietnam, Carter entered the
White House without a clear political mandate. Having defeated Ford
by less than two percent, Carter faced a difficult task convincing
both Congress and the American people of his new ideology.
Initial foreign policy victories made it appear that Carter would
pull it off. Unfortunately, several highly publicized failures in the
second half of Carter's term, along with domestic concerns, sent his
approval rating tumbling to 21 percent, three points lower than
Nixon's during the height of Watergate and the lowest approval rating
of any president since polling had begun.
When
Carter entered the White House, the first area he felt he could
strike a major blow for human rights was in Panama. The new president
immediately began probing his advisors for just how he should proceed
with the negotiations. In the months that followed, Carter
proved that he at least had the makings of a great negotiator and
president. Not only did he bring the initially hostile Panamanians to
an agreement that was quite profitable to both nations, but he also
overcame opposition. When Carter first submitted the treaties to the
Senate, the American public was two-to-one against ratification of
the treaties. In the months that followed, Carter and his
administration spread the word about the benefits of the treaties and
convinced a plurality of Americans to accept the treaties and give
the Canal Zone to the Panamanians. The ratification of the Panama
Canal treaties exemplified what the Carter administration stood for.
Not only did Carter correct what he saw as an injustice, but he also
remained open to the American people. Rather than going over the
heads of the public and simply wheeling and dealing with senators,
Carter took the fight for ratification right to the people and let
public outcry push the treaty through.
But
perhaps Carters proudest moment came when he brought Israeli
Prime Minister Begin and Egyptian President Sadat together in Camp
David. After the negotiations, critics of Carter, and indeed Carter
himself, pointed out that some of the most trying issues of the
region, such as the question of an autonomous state for the
Palestinians and Israeli withdrawal from occupied territory, remained
unresolved. However, Carter's skirting of the major issues was the
very thing that allowed for the peace treaty between two nations.
During the talks, Carter wisely separated Begin and Sadat and worked
toward abroad agreement that would be acceptable to both leaders. If
handled properly my Middle East leaders, the treaty provided the
framework to end 30 years of hostility between Israel and its Arab neighbors.
Even
this, one of Carter's greatest accomplishments, proved to have
little lasting effect. In May of 1980, Begin and Sadat were once
again in conflict when Begin refused to allow self-determination for
the Palestinians. The Israeli Prime Minister argued that the
Palestinian autonomy called for in the treaty meant limited municipal
control, not the full autonomy Sadat and Carter argued for. Although
Carter met with both leaders in Washington, Begin refused to
budge. After the bitter conflict over the weak language In the
treaty, there seemed to be little desire left for compromise of the
key issues in the region, namely Israeli security and
self-determination for the palestinians.
The
ineffectiveness of the Camp David Accords weren't to be Carter's
only failure in the Middle East. Two incidents, one involving
Afghanistan and one Iran, would destroy his credibility with the
American people and forever mar his foreign policy record. In
December of 1979, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan to gain a foothold
in the oil rich Middle East. Carter's illogical reaction to the
invasion proved totally ineffective. After the invasion, Carter's
principal moves were to place a grain embargo on the Soviets and
boycott the 1980 Moscow Olympics.
Although
one could argue that these measures would certainly punish the
Soviets for the invasion, Carter had absolutely no intelligence that
indicated an embargo or a boycott would convince the Soviets to
withdrawal from Afghanistan. Indeed, Carter's own national security
advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, who saw the Soviets as a global menace,
felt a more moderate response was appropriate, one that would punish
the Soviets yet leave the door open for negotiations and keep future
U.S.-Soviet relations in mind. As it was, Carder's heated reaction
raised the Soviets' ire and probably extended Soviet presence in the
region. Although the Soviet's refusal to withdrawal from Afghanistan
was an embarrassment to the Carter administration, the Iranian
hostage crisis would haunt Carter. Although Carter reacted as well as
he could once the hostages were taken, his administration's actions
leading up to the Iranian revolution were the real foreign policy
failures. The Carter administration's blind support of the shah and
the funds and military hardware the monarch received simply fueled anti-American
sentiment as the Iranians saw the Americans supporting the
oppressive regimes. While not Carter's fault, the
administration's reaction to the revolution showed that they grossly
underestimated both the influence of the Ayatollah with the people
and the feelings of the Iranians in regard to America. Because of
these two factors, the diplomatic steps that Carter took to ease the
situation, such as freezing all Iranian assets In the US, were almost
totally ineffective, considering the hatred Iran held for the United States.
Most
historians look back on the Carter presidency as a tragedy. The man
was well-intentioned and had a great deal of foreign policy success
in his term. Unfortunately, the situation he faced on entering the
White House was arguably more complex and difficult than any faced by
most of predecessors. Any president, especially one who could only
draw on experience as a governor, would have the global situation
difficult to deal with at best. |
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