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Harry Truman: Incidents The Truman administration faced perhaps the most important peacetime diplomatic issues in American history. The second of two devastating world wars in a generation was over, and the victors were in the process of shaping a new world order that, Truman hoped, would eliminate such conflicts in the future. Truman also faced the high point of the early Cold War, the Korean War, which almost led to another world conflict and confirmed American fears of a global Communist conspiracy. Negotiations with the Soviets Negotiations with the Soviets were difficult from the beginning. Stalin pushed for dividing Europe into spheres of influence and power, but the Americans were still committed to the wartime view of a new world order. The State Department asserted that the establishment of spheres of interest would be the greatest threat to world peace. (Kissinger 433). The Potsdam summit in July 1945 accomplished little but delineating American interests of collective security and morality in world affairs from Russia's interests in rebuilding and protecting itself through satellite governments. "The practical result of Potsdam was the beginning of the process that divided Europe into the two spheres of influence, the very scenario America's wartime leaders had been most determined to avoid." (436). After the war the first foreign minister meeting was held in London that September and October to negotiate peace treaties with Germany's allies, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania. (436-437). Resolving disputes over these issues, although it seemed impossible, would prove easier than securing self-determination for Eastern Europe. "The visits of Truman's emissaries to London and Moscow proved, above all, that he was still trying to steer a course between Roosevelt's view of how to maintain the peace, in which America had no partners, and his growing resentment of Soviet conduct in Eastern Europe, for which he as yet had no policy." (Kissinger 432-433). Truman had decided for the unity of the Western powers over continuing Roosevelt’s personal approach to East-West relations. With no other viable option, containment became the foundation of American policy. The U.S. was afraid of following up on Stalin's negotiations believing he was using them to unravel the new international order Truman had so daftly worked for. Containment would be the foundation of Western relations with the Soviets until the collapse of the USSR. Stalin misunderstood the ideology of American philosophy resulting in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Marshall Plan, and sweeping military buildup. He hadn’t anticipated such a strong American response (Kissinger 444). The Marshall Plan succeeded in returning Europe to a strong economic footing, while NATO, the first alliance in American history to occur in peacetime conditions, tended to the West’s security. The Marshall Plan After the war in Europe, most of the industry on the continent lay in ruins. In such conditions, with little to eat, no food, and the very necessities of life being almost impossible to get, there was a real danger of several European governments, including those of France and Italy, falling to domestic Communist movements. To head off these problems, and simulaneously to restore markets for American industry, Secretary of State and former wartime chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff George Marshall recommended that the United States fund a massive rebuilding effort in Europe. After bitter Congressional debate, the program passed, and the Marshall Plan prevented the collapse of the Western coalition to internal weakness. The program was remarkable in that it marked the first time the United States had acted as leader of the Free World on a grand scale, and in that the need for the program demonstrated how weakened the former imperial Great Powers had become. Korea The next challenge Truman faced was the Korean War. The conflict started when the United States began withdrawing troops and aid from South Korea, a move that the Russians reacted to by encouraging North Korea to invade. (Kennan 95). The Soviets didn’t believe that America would expend men and money to defend the peninsula, but again miscalulated. Truman compared this invasion to that of the Munich crisis, believing Russia was on path to gain worldwide domination just as Hitler was in 1938 and that the United States had to act now to head off a larger war somewhere else. (95) In his book At a Century's Ending, George F. Kennan remembered the Korean War and the role of the USSR as having, "something much more serious involved: namely, the impression we had that we were confronted, for the first time since the birth of the republic, with a great terrible, remorseless enemy, dedicated to our undoing, and holding in his hands the wherewithal to do us immense damage, even right here at home." (128).When the UN met to determine the fate of South Korea, all countries were present except Russia, who was protesting the non-recognition of Communist China. Losing their power to veto, Russia enabled the United Nations' forces under the leadership of General Douglas McArthur to pursue the enemy via amphibious assault back to the Yalu River above the 38th parallel. (Bailey 819-820). Truman did not ask Congress for a declaration of war or a resolution of support. He simply informed key congressman about the choices he had made as Commander-in-Chief and justified them bluntly: 'we've got to stop [the] USSR now.' This was war by the executive branch. Critics would later call it 'Mr. Truman's War.' (Paterson 473) Truman’s conduct of the war was complicated by the relative weakness of American forces in the Far East and by the impetuousness and insubordination of their commander, five-star General Douglas MacArthur. Although MacArthur had saved South Korea and taken the North Korean capital of Pyongyang by October 1950, he disobeyed orders by advancing too near the Yalu River, Korea’s border with China. The Chinese reacted by invading Korea with 300,000 troops, pushing UN forces back and turning the war into a bloody stalemate. Truman’s removal of MacArthur for criticizing the administration’s policies in a public letter to a Republican leader brought public opinion down hard against him, and this resentment would eventually help sweep Dwight Eisenhower into the Oval Office in 1952. |
Incidents
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