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Eisenhower: Incidents Korea The major foreign policy issue of the early 1950s was the war in Korea. Ike, as the general who had defeated the Nazis, had a special credibility on this issue, and when he pledged to the American people that he would go to Korea, his victory was assured. Eisenhower had two options to shorten the length of the war. He could launch a general offensive against the Chinese and Korean forces, including air strikes into Manchuria, but the allies (as the war was technically a UN operation) would oppose such a move as it would probably involve Russian troops in the war. Barring such a move, Eisenhower could use nuclear weapons. He was uneasy about such a move, not on moral grounds, but because the Soviet Union (which by this point had its own nuclear arsenal) would certainly become involved if its Asian allies were attacked. Instead, Eisenhower did neither, but let a combination of hints about the use of nuclear war, Stalin’s death, and his own military reputation do the job for him. By June, the Chinese and North Koreans were suing for peace. Eisenhower ran into an unexpected problem when Syngman Rhee, president of South Korea, refused to sign an agreement. Since Rhee’s troops guarded 25,000 communist POWs and held most of the front line, his assent was critical to a workable ceasefire. Eisenhower communicated to Rhee that unless the South Koreans signed the treaty, the United States would withhold all reconstruction aid and military support and all American troops would be immediately withdrawn. Rhee signed the treaty, and the majority of American troops were pulled out in July 1953. To Eisenhower, the lesson of Korea was clear: the American people did not have the stomach for prolonged fights without a conclusive end. This lesson would become amply clear in the 1960s, when another stalemate in an Asian land war tore apart American society. Vietnam: Dienbenphu and the Geneva Summit That conflict had its beginnings during the Eisenhower administration. In 1953, the United States declared that the loss of the French colony of Indochina to Communist rebels would be a blow to U.S. interests. But by 1954, through a combination of poor equipment, bad tactics, and a leadership unwilling to accept the reality of combat in the steaming jungles of Southeast Asia, the majority of French forces were defending a valley garrison of Dienbienphu, an area just a few football fields big, while Viet Cong forces shelled them from the surrounding hills and mountains. The debate about an American response was focused on an air raid, using either conventional or nuclear weapons. After Vice President Richard Nixon made an “off the record” comment that the United States should intervene with nuclear weapons, a brief war scare swept through the country. Texas Senator Lyndon Johnson said that sending troops into Indochina would be a “bloodletting spree.” Eisenhower’s policy was carefully calculated to bring the warring parties to the negotiating table without direct action. Thus he vetoed unilateral action and made the requirements that would allow American use of force (approved by the allies, especially Great Britain) so stringent that it was doubtful they would ever be met. But Eisenhower allowed Dulles to warn the Chinese about possible American action, and so the Chinese, French, and North and South Vietnamese met in Geneva to work about an interim agreement. Under the agreement, Vietnam was divided at the 17th parallel, and elections in July 1956 would determine the political future of all Vietnam. The U.S. was not a signatory to the agreement, but pledged to support its requirements. The temporary settlement of the war meant that the United States had replaced France as the principal defender of Southeast Asia against communism. The administration began civilian and military aid to South Vietnam and told newly installed president Ngo Dinh Diem that it would support his government as long as it worked toward democracy. Quemoy and Matsu Two small islands just off the Chinese main would provide the spark for the next crisis of the Eisenhower administration. 75,000 troops were stationed on Quemoy and Matsu, which were controlled by Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist forces based in Formosa (Taiwan). The presence of these Nationalist-controlled islands so near the People’s Republic angered the Chinese Communists, who saw the islands as stepping stones to an invasion of the mainland by KMT forces. The Nationalists thought that the islands were daggers pointed at the heart of their position as well. The tension built after the Nationalists were expelled from the mainland in 1949, and the private little Chinese Cold War lasted until the Chinese began shelling the islands in 1955. At this time, the China lobby in the Republican was especially strong, with the more extremist members supporting an effort to aid Chiang in a quest to retake the mainland. To this end, in 1953, Eisenhower had stated that the U.S. 7th Fleet would stop a Chinese invasion of Formosa, but would take no action against a Nationalist force. Once the shelling began, Chiang’s backers began demanding an American response. Eisenhower’s options were limited, though. The U.S. Navy couldn’t operate in the Chinese littoral because the water was too shallow, and any intervention would plunge the United States in the middle of the Chinese civil war. Thus, Eisenhower decided not to intervene. As he put it, “We’re not talking now about a limited brush-fire war. We’re talking about going to the threshold of World War III.” As he had done in earlier crises, Eisenhower contemplated the use of nuclear weapons. His response to the Chinese problem was brilliant, a combination of containment, massive retaliation, and poker. Termed “deliberate ambiguity,” Eisenhower dropped hints that he would consider using atomic weapons to defend the islands, but neither said that it would definitely be the American response nor deliberately ruled the option out. Save for another brief period of shelling in 1958, the Chinese backed down, unwilling to trade Beijing for Quemoy. Suez The 1950s were a period of decolonization globally, and in the Middle East, the withdrawal of traditional Great Powers like France and Britain meant that there was a possibility that the Soviet Union could turn several nations to its side. At the same time, the creation of Israel had stirred tempers in the region to a fever pitch. Eisenhower decided to step in to the vacuum being created by the imperial retreats and continue his policy of creating regional anti-communist alliances. The American government began supporting Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, and other smaller states and enlisted them in the containment policy. Egyptian President Gamel Abdel Nasser refused to join the Baghdad Pact, the founding document of the Arab anti-communist alliance, because he viewed Iraq as his chief rival to Arab leadership. Hence he started playing East off against West, capitalizing on American fears of Soviet influence to receive additional American aid. When Nasser recognized the People’s Republic of China in May 1956 (as opposed to Nationalist China, an American ally), the United States withdrew its aid. Nasser retaliated by turning to the Soviets and nationalizing the Suez Canal. The nationalization of the canal was a serious threat to the security of Western Europe. Two-thirds of European oil came through the Suez. If Nasser closed the canal, then European industry would grind to a halt and populations would freeze due to lack of heating oil in the winter. Great Britain, from whose companies Nasser had taken the canal, and France began formulating a plan to retake the canal. Under the pretext of a treaty that would allow them to send military forces to protect the canal from invasion, they would coordinate with the Israelis to spark an incident. Israeli leader David Ben-Gurion was eager to strike at Egypt and take the Sinai peninsula to guard against an invasion of his relatively tiny country. The British and French would serve notice that the canal’s neutrality was threatened, and then seize it. On October 29, 1956, the Israelis began their assault into Egypt, and the next day British and French stated their intention to seize the canal. On Halloween, Eisenhower gave British Prime Minister Anthony Eden a tongue-lashing that caused the British leader to break down and cry. While the Israeli army pressed forward, Soviet Premier Nikita Khruschev warned that thousands of Soviet “volunteers” would soon intervene. On November 5, British and French paratroops landed, followed the next day by ground forces. The Soviets upped the ante, hinting that neither London nor Paris would survive Russian rocket attacks. He then astounded the Americans by requesting joint military action against France and Britain. Eisenhower refused, but made it clear to the French and British that further action would not be tolerated. On noon, November 6, Eden stopped the invasion. The same day, the Israeli forces halted as well. By November 7, a ceasefire was in place, and the invasion forces were being withdrawn. The United States now faced a number of problems. Not only had the French and British been humiliated, but it was clear to the two countries that their days as Great Powers capable of autonomous action were over. As Henry Kissinger noted, once a country’s self-image has been shattered, it is normally impossible for it to be recovered. In addition to the morale crises of his allies, Eisenhower also had to deal with the fact that the United States was now the sole Western power able to respond to Soviet threats in the Middle East. However, he had little time to reflect on this because he had just been re-elected and because while the Suez crisis had developed, another major foreign policy problem had arisen. Hungary and the Soviets During the 1952 campaign, Eisenhower and Dulles had vaguely talked about “liberating” Soviet satellites. While the administration had quietly halted such talk in its official documents and speeches, Radio Free Europe continued to urge Eastern Europeans to take up arms against the Soviets. Such rhetoric was especially inspiring to these captive nations, since, as Henry Kissinger put it: “Soviet-style central planning proved intolerable in the long run, even in the Soviet Union; in the satellite orbit, it was disastrous from the start. . . . Whereas in the Soviet Union communism could present itself as an indigenous phenomenon, in Eastern Europe there could be no question that it had been imposed under duress and that ancient national traditions were being suffocated.” A combination of brutal Soviet-supported dictators and the presence of a convincing leader in the form of former Prime Minister Imre Nagy sparked a revolt in late October 1956. As the Israelis were mobilizing for their strike against Egypt, Hungarian revolutionaries were executing quislings. The Soviets, predictably, responded, and began moving Red Army units in. The United States appealed to the Security Council on October 27 to protest the Soviet move, but the resolution wasn’t taken up until the crisis was over. Eisenhower’s rather light-handed response to the Soviet suppression of the revolution is remarkable considering his slaps in the face to the French and British -- his allies! -- during the same week. Needless to say, the Soviets crushed the revolutionaries, and, as Stephen Ambrose put it, the streets of Budapest were full of the bodies of the Hungarian martyrs. The bottom line, Henry Kissinger explained, is that “the Soviet Union was clearly prepared to run bigger risks to preserve its position in Eastern Europe than the United States was willing to brave in order to liberate Hungary. Nothing could get around this equation.” |
Incidents
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