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Campaign 2000: George W. Bush
It's ironic that the candidate to articulate the most rational foreign policy of the campaign is also the candidate best known for his ignorance of the names of heads of state. George W. Bush's famed foreign policy gaffes -- the pop quiz, "Jean Poutine" -- undercut his credibility on foreign affairs and briefly made the Texas governor look more like former Vice President Dan Quayle than the next president of the United States.
Foreign policy may be Bush's strongest point, though. As one commentator pointed out, Bush has inherited his father's foreign policy team, and for all the criticism Bush the elder took on domestic affairs, "he was certainly sure-handed on international relations." His lead adviser on foreign policy, Condoleezza Rice, is a respected and erudite woman, and his vice presidential pick, Dick Cheney, is best known for serving as the Secretary of Defense during the Gulf War. Whatever experience in foreign affairs Bush may lack, it seems that his advisers are capable of taking up the slack.
America (or at least its national interests) First
Bush states the case for his policy in traditionally American terms. He states that "the basic principles of human freedom and dignity are universal," and pledges to help move the world toward a more democratic future. Yet he says something unusual for a major political figure when he admits that though Americans feel their institutions are superior, the country must realize that in other nations the "architecture" of domestic governments will vary.
This difference is a sign of Bush's major departure from the Clinton administration's thinking. Unlike the current administration (and nearly all presidents since Wilson), Bush unabashedly bases his policy on considerations of the national interest. Rice rejected the view that the United States can only exercise power legitimately on the behalf of moral considerations in the influential journal Foreign Affairs earlier this year. This somewhat cold-blooded approach may be at least partially responsible for the Bush foreign policy team's nickname of "Vulcans."
The practical effects of the Bush commitment to the national interest as opposed to moral considerations are far-reaching. For example, the governor stated last year that he supported the Kosovo intervention, but only on the grounds that it represented a vital American national interest. While making that statement, the candidate criticized President Clinton for unilaterally disavowing the use of ground troops against Serbia. In contrast to Bush's "national interests," Clinton justified Kosovo on purely humanitarian -- moral -- grounds. This raises questions: Would Bush have intervened in Somalia, like his father, or Haiti, like Clinton? Is "national interest" another catchphrase like "compassionate conservativism": full of soundbites and fury, yet signifying nothing?
War, not peacekeeping
One sign that it may not be an empty slogan is Bush's stand on multilateral institutions. Decrying the almost constant use of the military abroad, Bush said in a speech earlier in the year that "[we] will not be permanent peacekeepers." Indeed, under a Bush administration, Americans would not be "peacekeepers" at all, at least under the United Nations. His website pledges that the governor "would never place U.S. troops under U.N. command," although America would support "a U.N. role in weapons inspections, peacekeeping, and humanitarian efforts."
Rice explains in her Foreign Affairs article that the U.S. military "is not a civilian police force. It is not a political referee. And it is most certainly not designed to build a civilian society." It would not be in the American national interest to constantly deploy the military because, according to Rice, the military is the backbone of American strength and therefore the foundation for a secure world.
Rice recommends that the United States cooperate with "regional actors" to implement its policy, mentioning the Australian-led effort in East Timor as a template for future action. While few or no American troops would be involved, the United States could certainly lend "financial, logistical and intelligence support."
Interestingly, the last president to support a similar policy was Richard Nixon, whose Guam Doctrine dictated that certain countries -- Japan, Iran, Indonesia, etc. -- would receive American support to further American regional policy goals. Nixon was also the last president to place a major emphasis on the concept of national interests and the balance of power.
Aside from a reduction in peacekeeping missions, the Bush emphasis on the national interest is evident elsewhere. Rice believes that the current administration's policy of multilateralism has become an end in itself. She points out that the Kyoto global warming treaty demonstrates how this policy is hurting American interests. If the treaty were ratified, Rice says, American businesses would be hurt while Third World nations would be exempt.
A Bush presidency would adopt a more hardline policy toward rogue nations. Rice writes that "these regimes are living on borrowed time," and states that the "first line of defense should be a clear and classical statement of deterrence -- if they do acquire WMD, their weapons will be unusable because any attempt to use them will bring national obliteration."
A chill in the air?
Bush is taking an unusually hard-nosed stance toward Russia. His policies seem designed to demoralize and frighten an already paranoid nation that distrusts the United States. One Russian commentator wrote a few weeks ago that "An increase of isolationst tendencies int he United States would be a boon, if not for the entire world, then at least for Russia." Yet Bush's policies don't make allowances for the pitiable and dangerous state of the Russian Federation.
President Bush would insist upon a suspension of the ABM Treaty, something which the Russians have consistently said would endanger their national security. Even Bush's offer of unilateral reductions in American nuclear stockpiles below levels required for START II might not soothe Russian feelings; after all, the Russians will be forced to make cuts below START II levels themselves soon due to lack of funding. Bush's outspoken support of a national missile defense would only further drive the Russian government to fear an aggressive American policy. The fewer missiles Russia has, the more effective an American defense would be, and therefore the more threatening the defense would be to Russia.
Coupled with Bush's ABM/NMD policy is his pledge to resist a "return to Russian imperialism." Bush states that "the United States should actively support the nations of the Balkans, the Caucuses and Central Asia, along with Ukraine, by promoting regional peace and economic development." This policy too would further offend the Russians, who consider the former Soviet republics as part of their sphere of influence. As belligerent as the Russian government became over NATO's eastward expansion and air raids in the former Yugoslavia, which the Kremlin perceived as threatening Russia's national interests, an increased American role in what the Ministry of Foreign Affairs deems the "near abroad" could provoke a chilly response from Moscow.
What's their beef?
Critics of Bush's policies have noted that while he and his advisers have attacked the Clinton administration's Russian policy for allegedly supporting Yeltsin at the expense of the Russian democrats, "it's never made entirely clear how a GOP administration might have handled the situation differently given that the only viable political challenge to Yeltsin came from the communists," as Time writer Tony Karon noted.
This theme -- that Bush's rhetoric is devoid of substance -- is common among the campaign's critics. As Slate editor Michael Kinsley pointed out, the Republican platform bemoans the use of empty threats in the Balkans, " but doesn't say whether the threats should have been backed up by action or should not have been made."
The Washington Post criticizes the Bush campaign for ignoring "soft" issues like AIDS and international poverty while focusing on America's interests alone:
"The candidate has said that Africa ‘doesn't fit into the national strategic interests'. . . . But the idea that the United States should ignore the half of humanity that lives on less than $2 a day undercuts Mr. Bush's claim to a moral foreign policy . . . . The next president cannot remove a crisis like AIDS from the international agenda."
Conclusion
In sum, the Bush campaign has a coherent vision of what an ideal American foreign policy would look like: clear-headed, calculating, and somewhat more selfish than the Clinton administration's. Yet without careful diplomacy, Bush's policies risk alienating the Russians and creating a powerful enemy less than a decade after the Soviet empire imploded. Further, by ignoring Third World problems, he may inadvertently hurt the national interest indirectly by weakening future markets and directly by increasing the chance that AIDS may explode globally. |
Campaign2000 Bush
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