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WAR AND POLITICS: THE REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS AND THE CONTINUED RELEVANCE OF CLAUSEWITZ
by Antulio J. Echevarria II
Within the last two years historians and students of war have thought hard and written extensively about what the US military community now calls the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). The military's leading journals have recently published articles discussing the RMA's nature and its impact on future war--an emphasis on speed, precision, and intelligence rather than the mass production and target saturation so characteristic of industrial-age warfare. Likewise, literature from think tanks like the Strategic Studies Institute has soberly and thoroughly explored such issues as the RMA's impact on the structure and philosophy of the 21st-Century Army, on the execution of conflicts short of war, and on the nature and growth of information-age warfare. All are agreed that while older forms of warfare will continue to coexist with newer ones, the RMA, when it is complete, will mean that the conduct of future war will differ fundamentally from its antecedents. In its new form, future war will include soldiers with higher IQ's, knowledge-oriented weaponry, a five-dimensional battlefield (i.e., breadth, depth, height, space, and time--the ability and subsequently the need to act within the enemy's decision cycle), global envelopment, the capability to attack simultaneously and with precision at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels, and the apparent "civilianization of war" in terms of the broader public's increased direct and indirect participation in future conflict. In addition, the RMA is likely to pose serious challenges to statecraft as diplomats learn to adapt to the flow of real-time data and its impact on public opinion, and as the political limits and capabilities of future war are tested and explored.
Given the nature of this ongoing transformation, one might well ask whether the military thought of Carl von Clausewitz, developed over a hundred and seventy years ago, has anything relevant to offer to soldiers of the 21st century. Indeed, one author has recently argued that Clausewitz's wake is long overdue: "[Future] war will be fought not to pursue national interests, but to kill enemy leaders, to convert opponents to one's religion, to obtain booty, or sometimes, for simple entertainment. Thus the core of Clausewitz's philosophy of war--that states wage wars using armies in pursuit of political objectives--will disappear."*1 Other writers have maintained that nuclear weaponry, transnational constabulary warfare, counter-terrorism, counter-narcotrafficking, and the increased compartmentalization of political and military leadership evident in modern states have rendered obsolete Clausewitz's definition of war as an act of policy, and with it his tripartite conception of war.*2 We are further told that the value of Clausewitz's masterwork, On War, is diminished because of its failure to address war as a cultural phenomenon: It not only fails to explain why wars occur, it views war from only a single perspective, from within the Western nation-state paradigm.*3 This essay will argue two points: 1) the above arguments are based on a fundamental misunderstanding of what Clausewitz meant by politics; and 2) despite the technological changes now underway as a result of the current RMA, and those already in place due to the advent of nuclear weapons, his tripartite conception of war remains valid.
Clausewitz's description of war as a "continuation of politics (Politik) by other means" is of course well known. But it is unfortunately interpreted to mean that war is merely an act of state policy brought forth to acheive a political aim. At least part of the confusion surrounding this misunderstanding stems from the ambiguity of the German term Politik, for it means both policy and politics. But Clausewitz, too, deserves some blame, for he neglected to define in simple language how he wanted this multivalent term to be understood. Indeed, German scholars and soldiers alike have puzzled over this question since the late nineteenth century. Historian Eberhard Kessel argued, for example, that, for Clausewitz, Politik consisted of subjective and objective elements. The former pertained to the choice or choices made by the political leadership regarding the type of war to be waged and the specific aims to be pursued. The latter involved the dominant ideas, emotions, and political interrelationships unique to a given time and place.*4
In fact, Clausewitz's varied usage of Politik and the historical context within which he wrote indicate that he meant three things by the term. First, Clausewitz did intend Politik to mean policy, the extension of the will of the state, the decision to pursue a goal, political or otherwise. Second, Politik also meant politics as an external state of affairs, the strengths and weaknesses provided to a state by its geo-political position, its resources, alliances and treaties, and as an ongoing process of internal interaction between a state's key decision-making institutions and the personalities of its policy makers. Lastly, Clausewitz used Politik as an historically causative force, providing an explanatory pattern or framework for coherently viewing war's various manifestations over time. The first of these definitions is found predominantly in On War, Chapter 1 of Book I, which discusses war's nature. Because Clausewitz's undated prefatory note (the one presumably written in 1830) indicates that he considered only this chapter to be in final form, the temptation is great not to read beyond it. But readers must resist this temptation, for, while it may appear that the essence of what Clausewitz had to say about war might be grasped at the cost of reading fifteen pages rather than 600 (or over 800 in the latest German edition), this is not the case. In fact, as one historian has pointed out, strong (though circumstantial) evidence exists suggesting that the undated note was written some time before the note of 1827, and that On War is closer to completion than Clausewitzian scholars had previously believed.*5 Thus, as Christopher Bassford has succinctly explained, those who wish to gain a "genuine understanding of Clausewitz cannot escape the task of actually reading On War."*6 Indeed, one would do well to read beyond On War to include as many of Clausewitz's other writings as possible. His notes on history and politics and his essay on "Agitation" (Umtriebe), for example, show that his thought was continually evolving, and the hefty tome On War represents barely a third of it.*7 To be sure, Clausewitz is often clearer when read in his native language, but the primary prerequisites for understanding the great philosopher of war are really patience and the will to reflect.
In any case, the last three books of On War (Defense, Attack, and War Plans) contain most of Clausewitz's mature ideas as they pertain to the influence of politics on war. They also reveal that his military thought was becoming increasingly historicist--he sought to interpret individual historical epochs on their own terms and thus understood that the people who lived and fought in the wars of the past were governed by institutions, values, beliefs and customs unique to a specific time and place. It is in his chapter on "The Scale of the Military Objective and of the Effort to be Made" (Book VIII, 3B), in particular, that Clausewitz has broadened his conception of Politik to encompass definitions 1 and 2 mentioned above. He refers to policy-making, for example, as more than a mere act of intelligence or the product of pure reason: it is "an art in the broadest meaning of the term--the faculty of using judgment to detect the most important and decisive elements in the vast array of facts and situations."*8 This judgment, in turn, Clausewitz recognized as highly subjective, influenced by the "qualities of mind and character of the men making the decision--of the rulers, statesmen, and commanders, whether these roles are united in a single individual or not."*9 States and societies, too, were not limited in form to the monarchies (whether constitutional or absolutist) and semi-rigid social heirarchies characteristic of his day, but were "determined by their times and prevailing conditions;" states, for example, can be united, sovereign entities, a "personified intelligence acting according to simple and logical rules," or merely "an agglomeration of loosely associated forces."*10 Hence, the definition applies equally well to feudal lords, drug lords, or terrorist groups. Even Europe's numerous military institutions (e.g., its armies and command structures) have "differed in the various periods" of history.*11 In fact, in his later books Clausewitz's references to the "military" indicate that he meant by that term all institutions, procedures, philosophies, and values of the military as a community.
Clausewitz used several historical examples to illustrate how policy and political forces have shaped war from antiquity to the modern age. His discussions in the chapter on "The Scale of the Objective" include the vastly different yet profoundly similar wars of conquest and plunder carried out by the semi-nomadic Tartars (or Tatars) and those of expansion prosecuted by Napoleon. Clausewitz's selection of the Tartars as an example of politics directing war is significant, for, according to Keegan and van Creveld at least, their "tribal societies" fall outside the Western nation-state paradigm.*12 The Tartar tribes originated in Central Asia along with other Turkic peoples. In the 12th and 13th centuries they were overtaken by the Mongols and mixed with them. The Tartars participated in the Mongol invasions of eastern Europe and the Middle East.*13 They also converted to Islam and participated in the Ottoman Jihads, or Holy Wars of conversion, against the West. Tartar bands even raided Prussia in 1656-7, burning hundreds of villages, killing 23,000 people and stealing 34,000 captives to serve as slaves.*14 They thus fought for booty, to convert infidels, kill enemy leaders, and for entertainment--all motives for future war according to Metz. Yet, these motives, as Clausewitz understood, were shaped by resources available to the Tartars, their geopolitical position as a composite of Turkish and Mongol nations located in Central Asia, their nomadic culture and traditions, and the religious influence of Islam. All of these factors fell under the rubric of political forces in Clausewitz's eyes.
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