- Before 1990
Because the giant panda is rare, endemic to China and world famous, as early as 1936 the Hong Kong Da Gong Bao warned that if panda hunting continued, the animal was likely to become extinct. With the success of the revolution in 1949, the giant panda was declared a ‘National Treasure’ by the new Communist regime, and at the third National People’s Congress in 1957, the Communist Party determined to set up forest reserves. In 1962 a resolution was passed by the State Council –the body responsible for the day-to-day running of the country –to ensure the ‘positive protection and rational use of wild animal resources’. The export of skins and hunting was banned and, and the resolution stipulated that ‘the giant panda is a rare and precious animal’ and declared that natural reserves would be established for its protection.
As a highly specialized animal that is uniquely adapted to a dwindling habitat, giant panda would be the logical recipient of an exceptional conservation effort even if they were not so enormously popular with the general public. It is protected under the Endangered Species Act of 1973 and by international treaty. Over 130 nations have signed the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES), an international treaty regulating or banning trade in designated animal parts or products as well as live importation. In May 1980 a plan of action was drawn up by the Chinese Association for Environmental Science, the Ministry of Forestry, Academia Sinica and the World Wild Fund of Nature (WWF). A massive programme was agreed, which included the building of a research center, jointly funded by the Ministry of Forestry and WWF, in the Wolong Reserve in Sichuan. The Research and Conservation Center for the Giant Panda is equipped with laboratories, a breeding facility, a veterinary hospital, and a panda nursery.
From the beginning, Dr. Schaller reported that the project was besieged with communication problems. One problem entailed the WWF’s blatant promotion of the project, which was viewed by many in China as a publicity campaign to benefit WWF. WWF’s aggressive marketing of its interests (panda gold coins, postage stamps) and its aversion to sharing public recognition eroded Chinese trust in the project. And the partnership was jeopardized by a number of the other events, including failure to invite the Ministry of Forestry and the Chinese Academy of Science to a ceremonial signing; the WWF’s request that the head of the Chinese delegation sign a nonapproved addendum; China’s request for lavish high-technology equipment; and little flexibility in China’s demands. The spirit of cooperation collapsed.
By 1984, at a joint meeting of Sichuan and Wolong officials, Dr. Schaller said he was ‘sick at heart and angry’ because the action plan of the previous four years had yielded dismal results. He listed several sources of trouble: disastrous decisions by the Wolong leadership; constant interference in research and in pandas’ lives; no controls over poaching; no senior staff in the research center assigned to use the delicate equipment provided by the WWF; and broken equipment. He suggested cleaning house (assigning new, competent workers), monthly meetings, and designated job responsibilities.
Dr. Schaller’s field research ended in January 1985. By the end of 1987, seven of the eight pandas in his study were either dead or their radio had ceased to function, shrouding their lives in mystery. Research in both Wolong and Tangjiahe had ceased, and the research bases were deserted. However, since 1984, Dr. Schaller’s research has continued in another province, the Qin Ling Mountains of Shaanxi Province, by zoologists Pan Wenshi and Lu Zhi.
After the bamboo famine in 1983, China’s Ministry of Forestry made a plan to relocate 100 households (590 people) closest to the panda habitat. They were to be moved from the upper to the lower part of the reserve because no alternative place existed. To entice the minority peoples into resettling, new homes were constructed. Schools, a power plant, and pastureland were planned. But there was limited potential for agriculture in the area and therefore no way for the settlers to make a living. These moves were not enthusiastically accepted by the Wolong peasants. Thus, most of the new homes stood empty, and the peasants won the first round in the clash of wills.
Since hunting had been a serious threat to the number of giant pandas, in October 1987 the Chinese Supreme Court warned that anymore found guilty of killing a giant panda or smuggling hides would be charged under criminal code regulations governing offences that damage the economy and treated as a serious criminal, risking a jail sentence of between 10 years and life, and possibly even the death penalty. In February 1988 the first threat was carried out, and eleven people were given life sentences for killing two pandas. According to Gao Dezhan, China’s Minister of Forestry, 203 arrests have been made, and a total of at least 26 people have now been sentenced to between one year and life imprisonment for attempting to smuggle skins out of the country.
Any attempt to reverse the decline in panda numbers is faced with many different problems. Fundamental to any hope of long-term success must be an attempt to educate everyone living in or near a panda habitat about the aims and objectives of the conservation effort. The Chinese government has begun to tackle this, and in 1986 a campaign was launched in 5000 villages and forest farms throughout Sichuan, to reach farmers and villagers about panda protection, and to discourage the cutting of bamboo, as well as to give advice on how to cope with starving pandas. To prevent antipathy towards the project, local authorities in Sichuan allocated special funds to reimburse peasant whose homes or crops had been damaged by marauding pandas desperate for food after the bamboo flowered.