Background

Nixon's address on vietnamizing the war

November 3, 1969
(Department of State Bulletin November 24, 1969)

...Tonight I want to talk to you on a subject of deep concern to all Americans and to many people in all parts of the world - the war in Vietnam.

I believe that one of the reasons for the deep division about Vietnam is that many Americans have lost confidence in what their Government has told them about our policy. The American people cannot and should not be asked to support a policy which involves the overriding issues of war and peace unless they know the truth about that policy...

In January I could only conclude that the precipitate withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam would be a disaster not only for South Vietnam bu for the United States and for the cause of peace.

For the South Vietnamese, our precipitate withdrawal would inevitably allow the Communists to repeat the massacres which followed their takeover in the North fifteen years before...

For the United States, this first defeat in our nation's history would result in a collapse of confidence in American leadership not only in Asia but throughout the world.

Three American Presidents have recognized the great stakes involved in Vietnam and understoop what had to be done...

For the future of peace, precipitate withdrawal would thus be a disaster of immense magnitude.

- A nation cannot remain great if it betrays its allies and lets down its friends.
- Our defeat and humiliation in South Vietnam without question would promote recklessness in the councils of those great powers who have not yet abandoned their goals of world conquest.
- This would spark violence wherever our commitments help maintain the peace - in the Middle East, in Berlin, eventuaally even in the Western Hemisphere.

Ultimately, this would cost more live. It would not bring more war.

For these reasons I rejected the recommendation that I should end the war by immediately withdrawing all our forces. I chose instead to change American policy on both the negotiating front and the battlefront.

In order to end a war fought on many fronts, I initiated a pursuit for peace on many fronts.

In a television speech on May 14, in a speech before the United Nations, and on a number of other occasions, I set forth our peace proposals in great detail.

- We have offered the complete withdrawal of all outside forces within one year.
- We have proposed a cease-fire under international supercision.
- We have offered free elections under international supercision, with the Communists participating in the organization and conduct of the elections as an organized political force. The Saigon Government has pledged to accept the result of the elections.

We have not put forth our proposals on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. We have indicated that we are willing to discuss the proposals that have been put forth by the other side. We have declared that anything is negotiable, except the right of the people of South Vietnam ton determine their own future. At the Paris peace conference, Ambassador Lodge has demonstrated our flexibility and good faith in forty public meetings.

Hanoi has refused even to discuss our proposals. They demand our unconditional acceptance of their terms, which are that we withdraw all American forces immediately and unconditionally and that we overthrow the Government of South Vietnam as we leave.

We have not limited our peace initiatives to public forums and public statements. I recognized in January that a long and bitter war like this unually cannot be settled in a public forum. That is why, in addition to the public statements and negotiations,, I have explored every possible private avenue that might lead to a settlement...

But the effect of all the public, private, and secret negotiations which have been undertaken since the bombing halt a year ago and since this administrations came into office on January 20 can be summed up in one sentence: No progress whatever has been made except agreement on the shape of the bargaining table.

Now, who is at fault?

It has become clear that the obstacle in negotiating an end to the war is not the President of the United States. It is not the South Vietnamese Government.

The obstacle is the other side's absolute refusal to show the least willingness to join us in seeking a just peace. It will not do so while it is convinced that all it has to do is to wait for our next concession, and our nenxt concession after that one, until it gets everything it wants.

There can now be no longer any question that progress in negotiation depends only on Hanoi's deciding to negotiate, to negotiate seriously...

Now let me turn, however, to a mroe enxouraging report on another front.

At the time we launched our search for peace, I recognized we might no succeed in bringing an end to the war through negotiation.

I therefore put into effect another plan to bring peace - a plan which will bring the war to an end regardless of what happens on the negotiating front. It is in line with a major shift in U.S. foreign policy which I described in my press conference at Guam on July 25.

Let me briefly explain what has been described as the Nixon doctrine - a politcy which not only will help end the war in Vietnam but which is an essential element of our program to prevent future Vietnams...

I laid down in Guam three principles as guidelins for future American policy toward Asia:

- First, the United States will keep all of its treaty commitments.
- Second, we shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security.
- Third, in cases involving other types of aggression, we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.

After I announced this policy, I found that hte leaders of the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, South Korea, and other nations which might be threatened by Communist aggression welcomed this new direction in American foreign policy.

The defense of freedom is everybody's business - not just America's budiness. And it is particularly the responsibility of the people whose freedom is threatened. In the previous administrations we Americanized the war in Vietnam. In this administration we are Vietnamizing the search for peace.

The policy of the precious administration not only resulted in our assuming the primary responsibility for tighting th war but, even more significantly, did not adequately stress the goal of strengthening the South Vietnamese so that they could defend themselves when we left...

Let me now turn to our program for the future.

We have adopted a plan which we have worked out in cooperation with the South Vietnamese for the complete withdrawal of all U.S. combat ground forces and their replacement by South Vietnamese forces on an orderly scheduled timetable. This withdrawal will be made from strength and not from weakness. As South Vietnamese forces become stronger, the rate of American withdrawal can become greater.

I have not and do not intend to announce the timetable for our program. There are obvious reasons for this decision, which I am sure you will understand. As I have indicated on several occasions, the rate of withdrawal will depend on developments on three fronts.

One of these is the progress which can be, or might be, made in the Paris talks. An announcement of a fixed timetable for our withdrawal would completely remove any incentive for the enemy to negotiate an agreement. They would simply wait until our forces had withdrawn and then move in.

The other two factors on which we will base our withdrawal decisions are the level of enemy activity and the progress of the training program of the South Vietnamese forces. I am glad to be able to report tonight progress on both of these fronts has been greater than we anticipated when we started th program in June for withdrawal. As a result, our timetable for withdrawal is more optimistic now than when we made out first estimates in June.

This clearly demonnstrates why it is not wise to be frozen in on a fixed timetable. We must retain the felxibility to base each withdrawal decision on the situation as it is at that time rather than on estimates that are no longer valid.

Along with this optimistic etimate, I must in all candor leave one note of caution: If the level of enemy ectivity significantly increases, we might have to adjust our timetable accordingly.

However, I want the record to be completely clear on one point.

At the time of the bombing halt just a year ago, there was some confusion as to whether there was an understanding on the part of the enemy that if we stoppped that bombing of North Vietnam, they would stop the shelling of cities in South Vietnam. I want to be sure that there is no misunderstanding on the part of the enemy with regard to our withdrawal program.

We have noted the reduced level of infiltration, the reduction of our casualties, and are basing our withdrawal decisions partially on those factors.

If the level of infiltration or our casualties increase while we are trying to scale down the fighting, it will be the result of a conscious decision by the enemy.

Hanoi could make no greater mistake than to assume that an increase in violence will be to its advantage. If I conclude that increased enemy action jeopardizes our remaining forces in Vietnam, I shall not hesitate to take strong and effective measures to deal with that situation.

This is not a threat. This is a statement of policz which as Commander in Chief of our Armed Forces I am making in meeting my responsibility for the protection of American fighting men wherever they may be.

My fellow Americaans, I am sure you can recognize from what I have said that we really only have two choices open to us if we want to end this war:

- I can order an immediate, precipitate withdrawal of all Americans from Vietnam without regard to the effects of that action.
- Or we can persist in our search for a just peace, through a negotiated settlement if possible or through continued implementation of our plan for Vietnamization if necessary - a plan in which we will withdraw all of our forces from Vietnam on a schedule in accordance with our program, as the South Vietnamese become strong enough to defend their own freedom.

I have chosen this second course. It is not the easy way. It is the right way. It is a plan which will end the war and serve the cause of peace, not just in Vietnam, but in the Pacific and in the world.

In speaking of the consequences of a precipitate withdrawal, I mentioned that our allies would lose confidence in America.

Far more dangerous, we would lose confidence in ourselves. OH, the immediate reaction would be a sense of relief that our men were coming home. But as we saw the conseqences of what we had done, inevitable remorese and divisive recrimination would scar our spirit as a pople.

We have faced other crises in our history and have become stronger by rejecting the easy way in meeting our challenges. Our greatness as a nation has been our capacity to do what had to be done when we knew our course was right.

I recognize that some of my fellow citizens diagree with the plan for peace I have chosen... I would be untrue to my oath of office if I allowed the policy of this nation to be dictated by the minority who hold that point and who try to impose it on the Nation by mounting demonstrations in the street.

For almost two houndred years, the policy of this nation has been made under our Constitution by those leaders in the Congress and in the White House elected by all of the peple. If a vocal minority, however fervent its cause, prevails over reason and the will of the majority, this nation has no future as a free society.

And now I would like to address a word, if I may, to the young people of this nation who are particularly concerned - and I understand why they are concerned - about the war.

I reespect your idealism.

I share your concern for peace.

I want peace as much as you do...

I have chosen a plan for peace. I believe it will succeed.

If it does succeed, what the critics say now won't matter. If it dowas no succeed anthing I say then won't matter.

I know it may not be fashionable to speak of patriotism or national destiny these days. But I feel it is appropriate to do so on this occasion.

Two hundred years ago this nation was weak and poor. But even then, American was the hope of millions in the world. Today we have become the strongest and richest nation in the world The whell of destiny has turned so that any hope the world has for the survival of peace and freedom will be determined by whether the American people has the moral stamina and the courage to make the challenge of free-world leadership.

Let historians not record that when American was the most powerful nation in the world we passed on the other side of the rope and allowed the last hopes for peace annd freedom of millions of people to be suffocated by the forces of totalitarianism...