Economic Scene: South Korea Facing Difficult Economic Choices
by Peter Passel
For the moment, Korea-watchers are relieved:
Both the currency and stock markets have regained some of the
ground they lost in last week's nightmarish plunge. And all the
candidates in Thursday's presidential elections seem to have made
their peace with the strings the International Monetary Fund has
attached to its $57 billion-plus rescue package.
But that is hardly the end of the story. Much of what the IMF,
with strong support from the Clinton administration, is demanding
from Seoul is the free marketer's equivalent of mom and apple
pie: a restructuring of the financial system to make it more
competitive and more resistant to shocks, along with an opening
of trade and an easing of rules limiting direct foreign
investment.
Wednesday, South Korea made an important step in meeting those
demands, putting off plans to subsidize six of the nation's
biggest banks.
However, much remains controversial. To bring back foreign
capital and reverse the depreciation of the Korean won, the IMF
is also calling for high interest rates and fiscal austerity. And
while relatively few economists concur with Jeffrey Sachs,
director of Harvard's Institute for International Development,
that "the IMF's seal of approval is a seal of doom,"
there is deep uneasiness that austerity will push Asia into
recession and political instability.
"The IMF is substituting a technical fix for more flexible
treatment of a rapidly changing political problem," said
Albert Fishlow, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign
Relations.
It is no mystery what went wrong in South Korea. Backed by a
seemingly limitless supply of cheap loans from
government-controlled banks, a few dozen politically connected
conglomerates have long dominated the industrial landscape. They
grew at an incredible pace along with the economy. But with the
conglomerates' equity stretched paper-thin and the banks deeply
in debt to their counterparts in Japan, South Korea's capital
market was vulnerable to the currency turmoil that has whipsawed
Asia.
Nor is there much mystery about how South Korea must change to
complete the journey to economic maturity. The conglomerates need
to be restructured, leaving them with less debt and more managers
who measure success in profits rather than market share.
Insolvent banks must be liquidated or merged with foreign banks.
Others must tidy their portfolios, exchanging short-term
liabilities for long-term debt that is less subject to
speculative meltdown. Most of all, South Korea must make the leap
from planning to decentralization with few barriers to entry for
domestic or foreign competitors.
What complicates this rescue is the need to stop capital flight
by restoring international confidence. The IMF, taking a leaf
from the play book it has used from Bolivia to Ukraine, is
prescribing high interest rates along with a tight budget to
amass the cash needed to pay off depositors in failed banks.
Paul Krugman, an economist at MIT, acknowledges that tight credit
is probably a must. "If stabilizing the exchange rate is
important, what is the alternative?" he asked. But he balks
a bit at imposing fiscal austerity, which will throw hundreds of
thousands out of work and may push the economy into recession.
Sachs does not share his ambivalence. With South Korea's
exceptionally high savings rate and high-technology industrial
sector, he adds, it is folly to call for policies that reduce
consumption and investment -- and thereby force it to export more
deflation from a continent already flooded with surplus goods.
In Sachs's view, the United States and Japan should have moved
quietly months ago to stem panic in the South Korean currency
market, in essence acting as lender of last resort to an illiquid
but basically solvent economy.
Krugman doubts that would have been possible in light of Japan's
preoccupation with its own financial problems and the U.S.
Congress's post-cold war inclination toward navel-gazing. But he
does wonder whether it would not have been better to let South
Korea declare a moratorium on foreign debt repayment while it
moved swiftly to cleanse the balance sheets of the banks and
conglomerates.
The unspoken idea of the hour is "capital controls."
The IMF is deeply committed to mobilizing international capital,
reducing risk for investors and pressing countries to open
markets at virtually any cost. Restraints on currency
convertibility, the thinking goes, are an excuse for recidivism.
But with hindsight from the Asian currency mess, it appears that
the best way to get from here to there may not be the most direct
way. If the crisis deepens, involving Japan and China in
competitive currency depreciation, even the high priests of
global capitalism may wish to rewrite their catechism.
Copyright (c) 1997 by The New York Times Co. Reprinted by permission