The Battle of Gettysburg - Moving the Battle North

With Stonewall Jackson dead, and Grant heading for Vicksburg, the South needed a major victory to gain support from foreign powers and encourage the antiwar effort in the Union. General Robert E. Lee had two choices, “either retire to Richmond and stand a siege, which must ultimately have ended in surrender” because of the limited Confederate supplies, “or to invade Pennsylvania.” After his victories at Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, Lee believed his army was invincible. This is why Lee thought his army could go on the offensive and end the war, or at least relieve pressure from Vicksburg by threatening Washington and diverting Federal forces.

And with President Jefferson Davis’s approval...

Robert E. Lee Begins His Second Invasion of the North

On June 3, the Army of Northern Virginia moved from Fredericksburg to Culpeper. Left to defend the city of Fredericksburg from the entire Union army was A.P. Hill with three divisions. Union balloonists reported the movement of Lee’s army, and General Hooker contemplated taking the vulnerable city. On June 5-6 Hooker sent Sedgwick across the Rappahannock River to test Confederate strength. Sedgwick reported the position strongly defended. Meanwhile, at Brandy Station, Stuart held a grand review of Confederate cavalry. Stuart repeated the ceremony two days later for General Lee. News of the extravagant reviews reached the Union army, and on July 9, Hooker sent Pleasonton with 11,000 cavalry to Culpeper on a reconnaissance mission. The Union forces caught Stuart off guard at Brandy Station. There they fought the largest cavalry battle of the war. Having accomplished his mission, Pleasonton withdrew with his cavalry and reported to Hooker a concentration of the Confederate army around Culpeper. Hooker recommended an attack on the remaining divisions of the Confederate army and move farther South to Richmond. He would “swap queens” by taking Richmond, and leaving Washington to Lee. Lincoln rejected Hooker’s proposal arguing that “Lee’s army, and not Richmond, is your true objective point.”

Stuart’s image was hurt by the Battle at Brandy Station. Southern newspapers wrote “If he is to be the ‘eyes and ears of the army,’ we advise him to see more and be seen less.” While the main force of the army moved North, Stuart was responsible for masking the movement by blocking Federal probes. After this was accomplished, Stuart wanted to remove the stain he received at Brandy Station. On June 17, Ewell’s men had already crossed the Potomac and were in Sharpsburg, Maryland. With Lee’s permission, Stuart left half of his cavalry division to cover the remaining Confederate advance while he went with the other half to attack the Federal rear. Lee warned Stuart that as soon as the Federal army moved into Maryland, he must rejoin the rest of the army.

General Hooker slowly moved the Army of the Potomac north to protect Washington and intercept Lee’s army. On the June 25 and 26, Hooker’s army crossed the Potomac at Edwards Ferry. He complained that the government wasn’t supporting him and Lee’s army outnumbered him. Lincoln wrote to Hooker, “If the head of Lee’s army is at Martinsburg and the tail of it on the plank road between Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, the animal must be very thin somewhere. Could you not break him?” After Washington refused reinforcements from the Harper’s Ferry garrison for Hooker’s well equipped, adequately supplied army, he offered his resignation. On June 27 the President accepted Hooker’s resignation and replaced him with George Gordon Meade.

Critical Thinking

Was Hooker removed from command or did he quit? Did Lincoln sense Hooker’s fear to fight Lee? Or did Hooker use the Harper’s Ferry argument as a reason for him to quit? Decide for yourself.

As a result of poor intelligence reports, Hooker believed the Confederate army was larger than his. As a result, his plan was to indirectly strike the enemy by attacking their supply lines. This would have proved ineffective because Lee’s army didn’t need the supply lines, it could just feed off the countryside. Fortunately, Meade was provided with very accurate intelligence reports of the size of Lee’s army provided by civilians as it passed through Hagerstown. “The enemy force does not exceed 80,000 men and has 275 guns.” On Meade’s first day, he decided “I must move toward the Susquehanna, keeping Washington and Baltimore well covered, and if the enemy is checked in his attempt to cross the Susquehanna, or if he turns toward Baltimore, give him battle,” and on the 29th, he continued the northward movement of the Union army.