After both Patterson and Norris were found guilty in December 1933 in another round of trials, the defense again lodged appeals that delayed their executions and postponed the trials of the other men. The case was heard by the Alabama Supreme Court, which denied the motion and refused to reverse the convictions.

The case did not reach the Supreme Court until February 1935, some fourteen months after Norris had been convicted. Then on April 1, 1935, the Supreme Court declared that the state court had erred. The Supreme Court reversed the convictions of Patterson and Norris on the grounds that African-Americans, even those who met the narrow qualifications of the voting board, were systematically being excluded from Alabama juries in general and from the Scottsboro juries in particular. The Court found this situation to be an unconstitutional denial of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

Note that the Court determined that in the memory of all witnesses, no African-Americans had ever served on any jury in either county where Norris and Patterson had been tried.

Action of state through Legislature, courts, or executive or administrative officers in excluding all negroes, solely because of race or color, from serving as grand or petit jurors in criminal prosecutions against negroes, denies equal protection contrary to 14th Amendment (Const. U.S. Amend. 14).

Evidence adduced by negro defendant in criminal case that for a generation or longer no negro had been called for service in state court on any grand or petit jury within county held to make primii facie case of denial of equal protection guaranteed by 14th Amendment, and in connection with evidence that there were negroes qualified for jury service, whose names would normally appear on preliminary list prepared by jury commission, but that no names of negroes were placed on jury roll, and that commission did not properly consider negroes' qualifications, established unconstitutional discrimination, and hence motion to quash indictment should have been granted (Code Ala. 1923/8603; Const. U.S. Amend. 14).

Evidence adduced by negro defendant in criminal case on motion to quash trial venire beld to show long-continued, unvarying, and total exclusion of negroes from jury service within county, notwithstanding many negroes were qualified, thereby denying equal protection under 14th Amendment (Acts Ala. 1931, pp. 58, 59/11, 14; Const. U.S. Amend. 14).

After the remand, a motion for change of venue was granted and the cases were transferred to Morgan County. Norris was brought to trial in November 1933. At the outset, a motion was made on his behalf to quash the indictment upon the grounds of the exclusion of negroes from juries in Jackson County, where the indictment was found. A motion was also made to quash the trial venire in Morgan County upon the grounds of the exclusion of negroes from juries in that county. in relation to each county, the charge was of long-continued, systematic, and arbitrary exclusion of qualified negro citizens from service on juries, solely because of their race and color, in violation of the Constitution of the United States. The state joined issue on this charge and after hearing the evidence, which we shall presently review, the trial judge denied both motions, and exception was taken. The trial then proceeded and resulted in the conviction of Norris, who was sentenced to death. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the state considered and decided the federal question which Norris had raised and affirmed the judgment. 156 So. 556. We granted a writ of certiorari. 293 U.S. 552, 55 S.Ct. 345, 79 L. Ed.-

First. There is no controversy as to the constitutional principle involved. That principle, long since declared, was not challenged, but was expressly recognized, by the Supreme Court of the state. Summing up precisely the effect of earlier decisions, this Court thus stated the principle in Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S. 442, 447, 20 S.Ct. 687, 44 L. Ed. 839, in relation to exclusion from service on grand juries: whenever by any action of a state, whether through its Legislature, through its courts, or through its executive or administrative officers, all persons of the African race are excluded, solely because of their race or color, from serving as grand jurors in the criminal prosecution of a person of the African race, the equal protection of the laws is denied to him, contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.

Second. The evidence on the motion to quasb the indictment. In 1930, the total population of Jackson County, where the indictment was found, was 36,881, of whom 2,688 were negroes. The male population over 21 years of igc numbered 8,801, and of these 666 were negroes.

The qualifications of jurors were thus prescribed by the state statute (Alabama Code 1923/8603): "The jury commission shall place on the jury roll and in the jury box the names of all male citizens of the county who are generally reputed to be honest and intelligent men, and are esteemed in the community for their integrity, good character, and sound judgment, but no person must be selected who is under 21 or over 65 years of age, or, who is an habitual drunkard, or who, being afflicted with a permanent disease or physical weakness, is unfit to discharge the duties of a juror, or who cannot read English, or who has ever been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude. If a person cannot read English and has all the other qualifications prescribed herein and is a freeholder or householder, his name may be placed on the jury roll and in the jury box." See Gen. Acts Alabama 1931, No. 47, p. 59/14.

Defendant adduced evidence to support the charge of unconstitutional discrimination in the actual administration of the statute in Jackson County. The testimony, as the state court said, tended to show that "in a long number of years no negro had been called for jury service in that county." It appeared that no negro had served on any grand or petit jury in that county within the memory of witnesses who had lived there all their lives. Testimony to that effect was given by men whose ages ran from 50 to 76 years. 'Their testimony was uncontradicted. It was supported by the testimony of officials. The clerk of the jury commission and the clerk of the circuit court had never known of a negro serving on a grand jury in Jackson County. The court reporter, who had not missed a session in that county in twenty-four years, and two jury commissioners testified to the same effect. One of the latter, who was a member of the commission which made up the jury roll for the grand jury which found the indictment, testified that he had "never known of a single instance where any negro sat on any grand or petit jury in the entire history of that county."

That testimony in itself made a prima facie case of the denial of the equal protection which the Constitution guarantees. See Neal v. Delaware, supra.

'The case thus made was supplemented by direct testimony that specified negroes, thirty or more in number, were qualified for jury service.

Among these were negroes who were members of school boards, or trustees, of colored schools, and property owners and householders.

We think that the evidence that for a generation or longer no negro had been called for service on any jury in Jackson County, that there were negroes qualified for jury service, that according to the practice of the jury commission their names would normally appear on the preliminary list of male citizens of the requisite age but that no names of negroes were placed on the jury roll, and the testimony with respect to the lack of appropriate consideration of the qualifications of negroes, established the discrimination which the Constitution forbids. The motion to quash the indictment upon that grounds should have been granted.

Third. The evidence on the motion to quash the trial venire. The population of Morgan County, where the trial was had, was larger than that of Jackson County, and the proportion of negroes was much greater. The total population of Morgan County in 1930 was 46,176, and of this number 8,311 were negroes.

Within the memory of witnesses, long resident there, no negro had ever served on a jury in that county or had been called for such service. Some of these witnesses were over 50 years of age and had always lived in Morgan County. Their testimony was not contradicted. A clerk of the circuit court, who had resided in the county for thirty years, testified that during his official term approximately 2,500 persons had been called for jury service and that not one of them was a negro; that he did not recall 11 ever seeing any single person of the colored race serve on any jury in Morgan County."

There was abundant evidence that there were a large number of negroes in the county who were qualified for jury service. Men of intelligence, some of whom were college graduates, testified to long lists (said to contain nearly 200 names) of such qualified negroes, including many businessmen, owners of real property, and householders. When defendant's counsel proposed to call many additional witnesses in order to adduce further proof of qualifications of negroes for jury service, the trial judge limited the testimony, holding that the evidence was cumulative.

We find no warrant for a conclusion that the names of any of the negroes as to whom this testimony was given, or of any other negroes, were placed on the jury rolls. No such names were identified. The evidence that for many years no negro had been called for jury service itself tended to show the absence of the names of negroes from the jury rolls, and the state made no effort to prove their presence. The trial judge limited the defendant's proof "to the present year, the present jury roll." The sheriff of the county, called as a witness for defendants, scanned the jury roll and after "looking over every single name on the jury roll, from A to Z," was unable to point out "any single negro on it."

For this long-continued, unvarying, and wholesale exclusion of negroes from jury service, we find no justification consistent with the constitutional mandate ....

Johnson, Claudia Durst. Understanding To Kill A Mockingbird. The Greenwood Publishing, Inc. Wesport, CT:©1994.

The Mockingbird | Historical Archives | The Scottsboro Trials