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Maintaining Secrecy
Day 3: Wednesday, October 17
In order to maintain secrecy, Kennedy followed his planned schedule. As of yet, the Soviets didn't know the Americans knew of the missiles in Cuba. The American public didn't know yet either. If the Soviets found out, they might hide the missiles or launch them if they were ready. If the public found out, the nation would panic. Consequently, Kennedy broke off no public engagements for the next four days.
On Wednesday, Kennedy flew to Connecticut to campaign for the Democratic Party and congressional candidate Abe Ribicoff. During the speech he was in a good mood and he even joked, but as soon as Kennedy entered his car to return to Washington he became serious. Every spare moment was spent concentrating on the crisis. Robert Kennedy and Theodore Sorensen met the President at the airport and filled him in on what he had missed during that day's deliberations.
Throughout EX-COMM's discussions, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and especially the Air Force strongly argued for an air strike. The Air Force suggested bombing Cuba with over 100 sorties, but Kennedy would ask, "How many bombs do you want and what do you want to bomb?" Before the Air Force was done, they had planned a massive air attack that would have wiped Cuba off the planet's surface.
After another U-2 flight on the night of the 17th, the military discovered intermediate range (IRBMs) SS-5 nuclear missiles. With the exception of Washington and Oregon, these missiles could reach all of the continental U.S.
On October 18 Kennedy fulfilled a previously scheduled engagement to meet with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrie Gromyko. The meeting was a strange one. EX-COMM wasn't sure if Gromyko knew of the missiles or if he knew that the Americans knew, consequently Kennedy decided not to confront the minister on the issue.
Later that evening, a black-tie dinner was held in Gromyko's honor. As the guests entered the State Department to attend the ball, EX-COMM was preparing to meet just one floor below.  During the discussion a majority opinion had been reached on recommending a blockade. Those with an opposing view continued to dissent but the majority group wanted to head to the White House to inform the president. Instead of attracting attention by arriving in a convoy of official black cars, Edwin Martin of the CIA walked the few blocks, and the rest, nine members in all, squeezed into Robert Kennedy's limousine for the short drive. On the way one member commented, "It will be some story if this car is in an accident." At the White House, Kennedy liked the idea of the blockade because it provided the Soviets a way out of the crisis. But because EX-COMM still hadn't reached a consensus Kennedy instructed his speech writer Theodore Sorensen to draft two different speeches to give to the American public on October 22: one announcing a blockade and the other announcing an air strike. Kennedy still hadn't decided on the best course of action.
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"I don't think we've got much time on these missiles." |
Before leaving for a campaign trip to the Midwest Kennedy met with the Joint Chiefs, who still promoted the idea of air strikes. A consensus still couldn't be reached. Accordingly, Kennedy, who was already late, asked his brother to continue the EX-COMM meetings to draw up full plans for both scenarios. Again he chose not to cancel this trip because he wanted to maintain secrecy.
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The meeting began with a polite exchange over minor world events but soon shifted to Cuba. Gromyko read a statement to Kennedy saying that Soviet aid was "solely for the purpose of contributing to the defense capabilities of Cuba and to the development of its peaceful democracy. If it were otherwise, the Soviet government would have never become involved in rendering such assistance." In response Kennedy re-read a statement he had made on September 4 saying the U.S. would not tolerate offensive weapons in Cuba. Gromyko must have wondered why Kennedy was reading him the statement, but when he later reported to 
