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Crisis Center

Summary
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The Crisis Ends

A Public Withdrawal

"You accuse me of pulling out our missiles. What do you mean, that we should have started a war over them?"

-Premier Khrushchev to the Soviet Presidium

Crisis tensions eased on Sunday, October 28, but the ordeal was not yet over. The two superpowers still had to hammer out the terms of a formal agreement. During the course of the final negotiations Castro, who felt betrayed by Khrushchev, tried to halt the removal and inspection of the missiles. Eventually, with the help of the U.N., Castro backed down and the two sides reached an agreement. A U.N. inspection team was assigned to monitor the removal of the missiles and the demolition of the missile bases in Cuba. Then, the Soviet Navy shipped the missiles back to the U.S.S.R. The missiles were sent back on the decks of the ships so that American reconnaissance planes could count the missiles and make sure that all had been removed.

Soviet departing with missiles One stumbling block of the agreement was the removal of IL-28 "Beagle" medium-range bombers. Aware of the larger problem at hand, EX-COMM had decided to let this minor issue slide during previous negotiations. In Khrushchev's letter of the 28th, however, he stated the Soviets would remove all "weapons which you describe as offensive." With that statement, the U.S. was able to successfully argue for the removal of the bombers. Beginning on November 20, the planes were finally dismantled and returned to the U.S.S.R. The next day, November 21, Kennedy formally ended the quarantine and lowered Strategic Command's Defense Condition from DEFCON 2 to DEFCON 4.


Conclusion

"Having come so close to the edge, we must make it our business not to pass this way again."

-National Security Advisor, McGeorge Bundy

Looking back on the crisis, Robert McNamara claims the world was one step away from nuclear war. That step he said, was the President ordering the invasion of Cuba. What the military didn't know then was that they had grossly underestimated Soviet and Cuban force strength. Military intelligence calculated 10,000 Soviet troops on the island plus an additional 100,000 Cubans. We now know that the actual numbers were much higher. The Soviets had 43,000 combat-ready soldiers and Castro had mobilized 270,000 Cubans to fight. Plans for the American invasion called for a first day air strike consisting of 1,080 sorties and an amphibious landing of 180,000 troops. Those troops would have been surprised by the strength of the resistance they found on the island. Had Kennedy gone ahead with the invasion, casualties on both sides would have been much higher.

Furthermore, EX-COMM was also unaware of the tactical nuclear weapons stationed along Cuba's shore. Khrushchev had also given a standing order to his generals that if he couldn't be reached in the event of an invasion, they had the authority to launch the battlefield nuclear weapons. If Kennedy had invaded, the outnumbered Soviets would have used their nuclear weapons and then Kennedy would have had no choice but to retaliate with American nuclear devices. The response would likely have been an attack on Soviet soil.

JFK Perhaps the scariest part of the Cuban Missile Crisis was the lack of a reliable form of communication between Washington and Moscow. It could take up to seven hours to transmit a message from one capitol to the other. Imagine this: Khrushchev agrees to pull out his missiles, writes a letter, but it is delayed in transit. In the time it takes for the letter to reach Washington, Kennedy orders the invasion because Khrushchev took too long to reply. Once an invasion had started, it would be nearly impossible for the United States to pull out. As a result of the crisis, a "hotline" was established between the Kremlin and the White House so that the two world leaders could communicate directly. Neither side wanted to risk starting another nuclear war over poor communications.

Khrushchev Nine months after the crisis ended, Kennedy and Khrushchev signed an agreement to ban nuclear testing in the atmosphere. This marked the beginning of what seemed to be a new willingness to cooperate and communicate. However, on November 22nd, 1963 President Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas, Texas. Eleven months later Premier Khrushchev was removed from office by communist hard liners. One can't help but wonder what would have happened if these two men had stayed in power. Perhaps the same two people who brought us so close to nuclear war, now changed by that experience, could have brought us far from it.

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