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On the Brink
Day 13: Saturday, October 27
Saturday was the worst day of the crisis. One U-2 was shot down, another flew off course over Russia, a low-level reconnaissance mission was shot at over Cuba, and a second, more demanding letter was received from Khrushchev.
First, a U-2 on a "routine air sampling mission" over western Alaska picked the wrong star to navigate by and flew off course into Soviet airspace. When he realized his mistake, the pilot immediately radioed for help. The rescue station operator was able to give him directions to turn his plane onto the right course. By that time, however, the Soviets had detected the U-2 and scrambled MiG fighters to intercept the spy plane. The Americans also scrambled their F-102 fighters to provide cover for the U-2. The F-102s, prepared for action, had been armed with nuclear tipped air-to-air missiles. Fortunately, the U-2 left Soviet air space in time and two fighter groups never met.
Upon hearing the news at the White House, Secretary of Defense McNamara "turned absolutely white, and yelled hysterically, `This means war with the Soviet Union.'" The Soviets, he feared, could have interpreted the flight as a reconnaissance mission precluding a nuclear strike. President Kennedy 's reaction was much more calm and controlled. He laughed slightly and remarked, "There is always some son of a [-----] who doesn't get the word."
Next, around noon, news reached EX-COMM that a U-2 had been shot down over Cuba. Major Rudolph Anderson's spy plane was hit by a surface-to-air missile and crashed in the island's eastern jungle. EX-COMM interpreted the action as a planned escalation of the situation by the Kremlin. The order to launch the missile, however, did not come from Moscow. Rather, it was a Soviet commander in Cuba who gave the command. Khrushchev now worried that he had lost control of his forces.
EX-COMM had previously decided that if an American reconnaissance plane was downed, the Air Force would retaliate by bombing the offending site. Now that it had happened, the Joint Chiefs, who had been pressing for permission to bomb Cuba, pressed even harder. Secretary McNamara laid out the situation plain and simple:
General Taylor insisted that no "later than Monday morning, the 29th" the U.S. should strike Cuba. Kennedy chose not to attack, but to wait for another plane to be shot down. Then he would order the destruction of the SAM site. Years later, McGeorge Bundy, cited the two U-2 instances as "reminders that crisis managers don't always manage everything."
The next event in that long day was a low-level reconnaissance mission flown by six F8U-1P Crusader jets. Two of the jets aborted the mission early due to mechanical problems, but the remaining four continued on their course. As the fighters passed over the San Cristóbal and Sagua la Grande missile sites, Cuban ground forces shot at the planes with anti-aircraft guns and small arms. One plane was hit by a 37mm shell but, fortunately, it returned safely. Earlier that morning, Castro lost his nerve and ordered his troops to fire at American aircraft. With each new flight the Americans were gaining valuable information for an invasion Castro believed to be only 24 to 72 hours away.
Fourth, at 11:03 a.m. a second letter from Khrushchev arrived over a White House ticker. This letter, formally written, was much more demanding. Some members of EX-COMM speculated that hard-liners had pressured Khrushchev to take a more aggressive position. The letter was also publicly broadcast in order to reduce communication delays but the broadcast also raised the stakes. The two countries no longer had the luxury of private negotiations. Khrushchev wrote:
I therefore make this proposal: We are willing to remove from Cuba the means which you regard as offensive...Your representatives will make a declaration to the effect that the United States...will remove its analogous means from Turkey...And after that, persons entrusted by the United Nations Security Council could inspect on the spot the fulfillment of the pledges made... This letter sent EX-COMM reeling. Khrushchev's previous proposal had not mentioned Turkey. Why did it do so now? Unknown to the entire committee was Robert Kennedy's discussion with Ambassador Dobrynin the night before. Neither of the Kennedys had informed the committee about the meeting because of one reason: leaks. Too much information on the crisis had already been leaked to the press. Kennedy feared having someone go public with the Turkey proposal because it could potentially ruin his career. If the U.S. buckled under pressure and removed its missiles from Turkey, a NATO ally, the whole alliance could falter. A political enemy would have a field day holding Kennedy responsible for the Turkey proposal. One can sense the President's caution in suggesting the idea of a Turkey-for-Cuba missile trade in this transcript of an EX-COMM meeting.
Bundy (interrupts): But what most people, Mr. President?
JFK: I think you're going to find it very difficult to explain why we are going to take hostile military action in Cuba against these sites--what we've been thinking about--the thing that he's saying is, 'If you'll get yours out of Turkey, we'll get ours out of Cuba.'...We can't very well invade Cuba with all its toll when we could have gotten the missiles out by making a deal on the same missiles in Turkey. If that's part of the record I don't see how we'll have a very good war.
Kennedy was frustrated even more by the fact that he had wanted to remove the old, unreliable Jupiter missiles months before the crisis. Furthermore, Cuban missiles were not on par with Turkish missiles. The strategic value of the missiles in Cuba was immensely larger than the strategic value of the missiles in Turkey. Now Khrushchev wanted to make a public display of having the Jupiters removed.
The President was stuck. Dreading conflict, he couldn't demand more of Khrushchev. Fearing political pressure at home, he couldn't give in on the question of Jupiter missiles in Turkey. Then, Robert Kennedy had an inspiration: why not ignore the second letter and respond only to the first? A long-shot, but it might work suggested Soviet specialist Llewellyn Thompson. To Kennedy, it seemed the only viable option left. Consequently, the President had Robert Kennedy and Theodore Sorensen draft a response. In forty-five minutes they returned to the meeting. The committee then edited the proposal and approved it.
After the meeting adjourned, Kennedy called six men into the Oval Office -- McNamara, Robert Kennedy, Bundy, Rusk, Thompson, and Sorensen for further consultation. The President informed them of the Attorney General's meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin on the previous evening and asked for more suggestions on how to use this precious channel of communication. The group agreed to have the Attorney General meet with Dobrynin again to orally reinforce the proposal. Secretary Rusk also suggested that Robert Kennedy propose a secret deal on the Jupiter missiles in Turkey.
Click here to read a copy of Dobrynin's cable
.
At 8:05 p.m. Kennedy released his response to Khrushchev's latest proposal. It was given to the press to avoid any communications delays.
In case Khrushchev did not accept the terms of the agreement, Kennedy and Rusk drew up a contingency plan for publicly announcing a Turkey-for-Cuba missile trade. Late in the evening the two secretly contacted Andrew Cordier, a former U.N. undersecretary and friend of Rusk, in New York. Rusk dictated a statement to Cordier that called for an open missile trade. If he received the correct signal from Washington, Cordier was suppose to deliver the statement to Secretary General U Thant, who would in turn make it public.
McGeorge Bundy later likened the evening of the 27th to a tight chess match. The U.S. had made its move he said. It was now up to Khrushchev to make his. Until then, the U.S. could only hope and wait. "We had not abandoned hope," Robert Kennedy said, "but what hope there was now rested with Khrushchev... It was a hope, not an expectation. The expectation was a military confrontation by Tuesday (October 30) and possibly tomorrow."
Early in the morning, Khrushchev met with a circle of his advisers outside of Moscow. During the night he had received statements from both Dobrynin and Fomin, so he was aware how serious the crisis had become. At the opening of the meeting it got worse. A general entered and read a statement he had just received that Kennedy was going to make an address to the nation at 5:00 p.m. At that point, Khrushchev feared the worst. That address could be the announcement that an invasion was already underway. Khrushchev was not prepared to start a war, therefore he and his advisors drafted a letter with the utmost urgency. Upon completion, the letter was rushed at full speed to the broadcasting station. Khrushchev hoped the message would reach Kennedy before 5:00 p.m.
I have received your message of October 27, 1962. I express my satisfaction and gratitude for the sense of proportion and understanding of the responsibility borne by you at present for the preservation of peace throughout the world...
In order to complete with greater speed the liquidation of the conflict... the Soviet Government... in addition to previously issued instructions on the cessation of further work at building sites for the weapons, has issued a new order on the dismantling of the weapons which you describe as "offensive," and their crating.
The message, received at 9:00 a.m. (EST), effectively ended the crisis. The reaction among the EX-COMM members was mixed. Most were relieved, but others, especially the Joint Chiefs dubbed the announcement a ploy by Khrushchev to buy more time. General Curtis LeMay suggested that the United States "go in and make a strike on Monday anyway." Kennedy, on the other hand, knew the response was genuine. Almost immediately he drafted a response, which was broadcast over the Voice of America:
In Cuba, Castro was furious. Khrushchev had not had time to inform his ally of the decision, so Castro learned about the agreement over the radio. Hours later, and still immensely angry, Castro countered the agreement by saying a true solution would have included five more points: (1) an end to the economic blockade against Cuba; (2) an end to all subversive activities carried out from the United States against Cuba; (3) a halt to all attacks on Cuba carried out from the U.S. military bases on the island of Puerto Rico; (4) the cessation of aerial and naval reconnaissance flights in Cuban airspace and waters; (5) and the return of Guantanamo naval base to Cuba.
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At 7:45 that evening, Dobrynin came to the Justice Department to meet with the Attorney General. Kennedy handed him a copy of the reply to Khrushchev's letter and then informed him of the secret deal. He gave assurances that the U.S. would quietly remove the Jupiters a few months after the crisis but warned they could not be part of a public deal. Robert Kennedy also imposed an ultimatum to Dobrynin. "If you do not remove those bases, we would remove them." He concluded by saying a Soviet commitment was needed by tomorrow. Immediately after the meeting Dobrynin cabled Khrushchev to tell him of the proposal and that the Attorney General had imposed a deadline for a response. The Soviets just didn't know what that deadline was.
Meanwhile, at the request of Secretary Rusk, John Scali met once again with Aleksandar Fomin. Rusk wanted Scali to find out why Khrushchev had suddenly introduced the Jupiter missiles into the deal. When Scali met Fomin in an empty ballroom at the Statler Hotel, he exploded. Why, Scali demanded, had Khrushchev performed a "flip-flop?" In response, Fomin muttered something about "poor communications." Scali, not satisfied with the answer, then accused Khrushchev of performing a "stinking double-cross." The ABC News corespondent, in the heat of the moment, then gave a warning he had no right in making: "American invasion of Cuba is only hours away," said Scali. Fomin was deeply impressed by the statement. After the two parted ways he hurried back to the Soviet embassy to report the latest news to Khrushchev, while Scali wrote a memorandum summing up the encounter for EX-COMM.
At 11:00 a.m. Ambassador Dobrynin arrived at the Justice Department to extend Khrushchev's best wishes to the Attorney General and the President. EX-COMM also ordered a halt to all reconnaissance flights on the 28th. In the afternoon Dean Rusk held a press conference and cautioned against gloating over the Soviet decision. "If there is a debate, a rivalry, a contest going on in the Kremlin over how to play this situation," Rusk warned, "we don't want...to strengthen the hands of those in Moscow who wanted to play this another way." The Secretary of State also pointed out that because of inspection issues and the IL-28 bomber question the crisis was still not settled.
