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Efforts to curb nuclear proliferation face a series of major new challenges. First, the nuclear smuggling network established by
Abdul Qadeer Khan demonstrated that proliferation can be actively assisted not only by national governments, as in the past, but also by private, nonstate persons and organizations that have access to key knowledge and equipment. Khan’s sale to Libya of all the key elements needed to build a gas centrifuge uranium enrichment plant and his sale of a proven nuclear weapon design was unprecedented. Khan appears to have transferred most, if not all, of these to Iran and North Korea, as well. In addition, Khan’s network established machining shops in Malaysia and perhaps in other locations to manufacture key centrifuge components, making these activities extremely difficult to detect for foreign intelligence services seeking to slow proliferation. |
| It is not known whether elements of Khan’s network still survive and how many customers may have received copies of highly sensitive documents. These nonstate actors are far less visible and can be far more difficult to influence than nations, which can be pressured diplomatically, or threatened militarily, to change their behavior.UN Security Council Resolution 1540 will encourage states such as Pakistan and Malaysia to better control activities related to weapons of mass destruction within their borders and to prevent improper exports. The effectiveness of this new element of the nonproliferation “regime” remains uncertain, however. The IAEA is also encouraging NPT nonnuclear weapon states to give the agency broader inspection authority under an additional protocol to their basic inspection agreements with the agency. The new authority will give the agency the right to demand access to any site in a country where the agency believes activities related to nuclear weapons development may be taking place. This authority, if widely granted, could significantly restrict future nuclear smuggling networks. |
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