Ten years after the entry-into-force of the NPT, the 112 parties met again for the second NPT Review Conference. The Conference was held in Geneva from August 11 to September 7.
Unlike the 1975 Review Conference, the member states attending the Second Review Conference were unable to come to a Final Declaration. The primary obstacle with disagreement over the implementation of Article VI, which called for the nuclear weapons states to put forth good effort to disarm.
All members noted with satisfaction that the number of parties to the Treaty had significantly increased in the last 5 years. Still, several parties noted with concern the lack of universal adherence to the Treaty and pointed out that several non-parties operated sizable nuclear facilities not under the auspices of the IAEA.
Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons...
Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes...not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices
Articles I and II, Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
Controversy arose over the obligation of parties under Articles I and II of the NPT. Some states asserted that the collaboration and cooperation of non-nuclear weapons states in exporting nuclear material and technology constituted action contrary to non-proliferation.
Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.
Articles VI, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
Once again, the most intense debate arose over the implementation of Article VI disarmament of NWS. Most parties maintained that the NWS had not sufficiently fulfilled their obligations to negotiate effective measures to stop the nuclear arms race. There was a general feeling that the Conference should urge the major NWS to increase their efforts to disarm. Many NWWS called for a comprehensive test ban treaty (see CTBT) and for the ratification of the 1979 SALT II disarmament agreement between the US and the Soviet Union.
Many states acknowledged that the NWS had made some progress on the issue of security assurances since the First Review Conference. At the 1978 first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the five NWS made individual declarations with respect to security assurances to the NNWS.
The NNWS, especially the non-aligned members, felt that they should be entitled to more security guarantees since they themselves had refrained from acquiring nuclear weapons. In debate, several proposals arose, varying from an endorsement by the UN General Assembly or Security Council on the 1978 declarations to the implementation of a legally binding agreement to assure the NNWS that they would not be harmed by the threat or use of nuclear weapons.
The parties overall expressed satisfaction with IAEA safeguards procedures under Article III. It was noted, however, that those procedures would require constant improvement to deal with the increasing amounts of nuclear material and the increasing complexity of nuclear fuel cycle facilities. Many parties also suggested that non-party NNWS should also be required to submit to IAEA safeguards.
All the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
Articles IV, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
With respect to implementation of Article IV, which provided for the transfer of peaceful nuclear technology, several developing nations expressed their dissatisfaction with "restrictive" export policies implemented by suppliers of peaceful nuclear technology. Concern was also put forth that some nuclear suppliers that were parties to the NPT had continued to engage in illicit nuclear trade with non-parties, often utilizing less stringent safeguards.
In the end, even though there was no agreement on a Final Declaration, many nations reaffirmed that the primary purpose of the Treaty was to achieve the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons.
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